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Abstract
A Contemporary Tale of Two Countries - State of Children in India and Pakistan
Arijit Ray
Some common economic problems of the Indian subcontinent are its low per-capita income,
major dependence on agriculture, heavy population pressure, chronic unemployment, slow capital
formation, limited opportunity for human capital development, rising pollution, and heavy inequality
in the wealth distribution. Each of these problems affects its children in its unique way, both directly
and indirectly. However, some problems are human-made which directly affect its own existence. I
focus on two countries in the Indian subcontinent: India and Pakistan, where such problems exist.
In both societies, female children are valued less than male children, a theme which is common across
many other countries in South-East Asia. Also, in both these countries, the rural-urban education
gap is large, due to a lack of economic progress in rural areas. The Government of India has come
forward to change the various existing cultural bias against female children in society and improve
the lives of children, in general. Pakistan, on top of sharing these common issues, has been recently
affected by the intentional mass destruction of public properties and human lives by terrorist entities
that aim to overthrow public peace. My objective is to understand how these contemporary events
have changed the picture of the two countries that we are familiar with.
Chapter 1 focuses on the cultural bias against female children that has led to an increasingly
skewed female to male sex ratio in India. To counter this trend, several Indian states have adopted
policies that offer future large cash incentives toward female children, subject to fulfilling certain
conditions such as keeping female children unmarried until 18 and restricting the number of births.
I examine whether these policies are successful in increasing female to male sex-ratio at birth. Using
detailed survey data from India and a difference-in-difference strategy, I find female births increase
by 0.9 - 1.7 percentage points at birth order one or two. However, I do not find any effect of
these policies on overall female to male birth ratio. Surprisingly, I find the death rates for female
children have increased at early birth orders and have decreased for their male counterparts, which
is a spillover on the male children. Vaccination rates have fallen for both sexes post-policy period,
indicating a possible shift of state attention from essential healthcare. However, effects are more
pronounced for female children more than male children, indicating more postnatal sex-selection. A
possible explanation is that under limited resources, large cash incentives paid in the future do not
help supporting current expenditure on a larger family where female and male children both live and
under ‘son-preference’, female children continue to bear a disproportion burden of the constraint.
Chapter 2 looks at the inadequate school infrastructure in rural India. An important cause of
the rural-urban educational gap is the lack of basic school infrastructure in the rural areas, such
as availability of restrooms for children in schools, possibly causing children to fall sick and miss
schools. Adolescent female children may drop out at a disproportionate rate due to a lack of privacy.
In an effort to improve the health of children in rural areas, the government of India took a country-
wide initiative to build restrooms in schools, known as the School Sanitation and Hygiene Education
program. Using a combination of district-level school characteristics and individual-level data from
various nationally representative sources, I examine the impact of this initiative on the educational
gap between rural and urban areas, particularly for female children. I find completion rates and
years of education have increased in rural areas, reducing the rural-urban literacy gap. Elder female
children who completed secondary education experience improvement in higher secondary school
completion while male children do not, indicating the importance of separate female restrooms in
schools. Furthermore, female children in low-income states completed secondary education more
than before, an effect which is absent for the rest of the country.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Dr. Umair Khalil and Dr. Daniel Grossman. Our objective is to
study how the recent rise in terrorist activity affects the health of children exposed to violence. Using
spatial and temporal variation in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, combined with a fixed effect strategy
at various levels, we identify the causal effect of terrorist activity on height, weight, and health
behaviors of children. We find that a one-standard deviation increased intensity of attack, defined
as number of fatalities per attack, leads to approximately 5 more children per 1000 being stunted
if attacks occur during gestation and between 12 and 19 more children per 1000 being stunted if
attacks occur post birth. For low weight, a measure of short-term malnutrition, we find a one-
standard deviation increased intensity of terrorist attack leads to between 8 and 12 more children
per 1000 being low weight if attacks occur post birth. For both severely stunted and very low
weight, we find statistically significant effects only for attacks during gestation. We also document
a reduction of between 2 and 8 per 1000 children in vaccination take-up, in response to terrorism
immediately before birth. Conclusions: Overall, we conclude that violent events experienced in
utero or in early childhood can have long lasting impacts on health and human capital development.
Reduced interaction with healthcare infrastructure is a possible mechanism at work.
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1Chapter 1
Are Conditional Cash Transfer Schemes for Female Children Effective in
Increasing Sex Ratio at Birth? Evidence From India
1.1 Introduction
One form of discrimination in almost every society is based on the sex of a person. In
the Indian context, the disadvantaged sex is the female and such prejudice arises from
the son-preference which is deep-rooted in the cultural practices and kinship structure
of the society (Das Gupta et al., 2003). Female children face discrimination much
before they are born. Parents take advantage of the latest healthcare technologies,
e.g. ultrasound, to know the sex of the fetus and abort them if it is a female. In case
they are born, they suffer from deliberate negligence and die or in many instances, are
killed intentionally. This practice of sex-selection against female children has resulted
in a falling ratio of female to male children over time1.
To revert this downward trend, the Indian government has taken two types of
measures. One of them is to ban the use of ultrasound to reveal the sex of the
fetus while the other strand of measures targets the underlying son-preference of
parents in society. A legal restriction on determination of sex of fetus to curb sex-
selection is likely to be ineffective as ultrasound use for maternal care is not illegal
1Biological sex ratio at birth is considered to vary between 950 - 960 females for every 1000 male birth. According
to the census of India, in 1981, there were 962 female children for every 1000 male children between 0-6 years of age. It
was the last time female to male child sex ratio was found to be above the benchmark. With the advent of affordable
prenatal determination of sex technique in India around mid ’80s, a lower child sex ratio followed in the subsequent
censuses. In 1991, there were 945 females per 1000 male birth and in 2001, there were 927 females for every 1000
male birth.
2in India, and in the absence of strict regulation, a health care worker2, who performs
an ultrasound scan during an ante-natal-care visit, may disclose the sex to an eager
mother informally3. Even if the law were successful, parents could still substitute to
post-natal sex-selection (Goodkind, 1996), where they invest less in their daughters
compared to their male counterparts. Reasons for post-natal sex selection vis-a-vis son
preference are that, first, the kinship structure in India dictates that sons continue to
stay with their parents and only sons have the right to complete their funeral services
after death and second, sons add to the wealth of the family continuously, whereas
cultural system demands that daughters have to be married off after certain age, which
involves large economic cost. Further, after marriage, she becomes a member of her
husband’s family, thereby no longer adding value to her own family. Basic economic
theory predicts the pursuit of an action that entails the most benefit and reduction
of activities that involve cost. Therefore, parents make a differential investment in
their sons over daughters (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Jayachandran and
Pande, 2015). Any policy that seeks to stop sex-selection by targeting underlying
son-preference will have to counteract the cost of raising a female child. Following
this idea, Indian states have enacted several policies around 2005, which offer large
cash transfers only to female children when their parents fulfill certain conditions
such as restrict the number of children and keep daughters unmarried until they
reach eighteen years of age, which is the legal age of marriage for girls. Despite
the availability of these policies, the number of female children (per 1000 boys) has
plummeted further to 919 in the 2011 census from 927 in the 2001 census. A natural
question that follows is whether these policies were effective in influencing the female
to male sex ratio at birth and I explore precisely this question in the paper.
A reason to expect that such policies may raise the female to male birth ratio is that
2Health care workers in India are the doctors, nurses, ancillary health professionals, midwives, pharmacists, tra-
ditional practitioners. Ultrasounds are usually are performed by a compounder who works for a doctor and often do
not have medical certifications ( Fan and Anand, 2016). They perform the scan mechanically and over time and may
learn to interpret scan reports.
3Although Nandi and Deolalikar, 2013 estimate that the national Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostics Tech-
niques (PNDT) Act of 1994 was associated with 106,000 female children being saved
3parents could use the lump sum terminal cash transfer to cover a portion of the future
marriage expense of their daughters, a large part of which accrues due to a dowry.
Social norms for female children in India considers marriage to be more important
than any form human capital development (McCleary-Sills et al., 2015) and therefore,
incentivizing parents not to abort female children through monetary reward to cover
marriage expense may work4. Accordingly, I focus on 17 states with such conditional
cash transfer schemes only for female children with terminal benefits obtained at the
end of 18 years. A list of those policies along with the rewards is reported in Table 1
while the associated conditions for each of these policies are listed in Table 2. Some of
these policies require the parents to take them for immunization while others require
either of the parents to undergo sterilization. There is considerable variation in the
timing of the introduction of these policies which I exploit to see whether they played
a role in affecting the sex ratio at birth.
Conditional cash transfer policies have been effective as a measure against poverty.
A Mexican cash transfer program, Progresa, has positive effects on education (Parker
and Todd, 2017; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009), heatlh (Gertler, 2004), and on labor
market outcome (Parker and Vogl, 2018). In the context of India, such policies had
taken to improve education, health, age at marriage, and finally to improve female to
male sex-ratio at birth – the focus of this study (Prabhu et al., 2009). The effectiveness
of conditional cash schemes on female to male sex ratio has been inconclusive (Sinha
and Yoong, 2009; Srinivasan and Bedi, 2011; Anukriti, 2018). This paper contributes
to the literature by studying those conditional cash transfer policies to increase female
to male sex ratio, which condition on both fertility and age of marriage. Previous
studies have looked at sex-ratio and fertility trade-off (Anukriti, 2018) or simply sex-
ratio (Srinivasan and Bedi, 2011) for a single state. In this paper, I identify policies
targeting sex ratio–fertility–age of marriage available across many states in India
and examine their effect on sex-ratio. Additionally, I explore whether these policies
4It is more likely that parents will associate a large cash transfer to marriage expense when the priority is to get
daughters married off.
4were effective in decreasing the death rate of females compared to male children and
whether they influence health care take-up of female children.
To examine the effect of these policies, I rely on a difference-in-difference method,
exploiting the state and time variation in their introduction. In particular, I look
at the effect of these policies on the sex-ratio at the first two birth orders. The
motivation behind using such a method is a combination of two conditions of these
policies. First, the transfers are only for female children and second, the number
of children has to be restricted to two or three in most cases. If these policies are
effective, then the effect should, on average, be highest at the first two birth orders.
The literature on sex ratio has focused on birth orders (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010;
Kalsi, 2017) assuming no sex-selection at first birth. However, given a restriction on
the number of children, parents could sex select even at the first birth (Anukriti,
2018). Indeed, I find that there are about 17 more female children born per 1000
birth in order 1 and about 11 more female children born at birth order 2. An increase
in the birth ratio may testify for the reduction in prenatal sex-selection.
To understand the effect on post-natal sex selection, I look at the death rate of
children using a triple-difference method, using birth order, time and state of birth
of the children, and sex of the children. Surprisingly, I find female children are more
likely to die compared to male children. Abandonment of female children after birth,
infanticide, and Lack of care are the most common (Das Gupta et al., 2003; Caldwell,
2006; Kumar and Sinha, 2018; Sudha and Rajan, 1999). With available data, I look
at immunization take-up and breastfeeding of these children and I find weak evidence
of differential treatment of female children in case of certain vaccines. The mechanism
through which such post-natal death occurs differentially for female children could
be explored more precisely if we had data on their quality and quantity of food
consumption or if we had historical data on health care take-up due to common
illnesses such as fever. Literature (Pokhrel et al., 2005; Hazarika, 2000) shows that
parents are less willing to seek medical care if their daughters fall sick. I argue that
5while these policies are offering large cash transfers, parents have to wait until their
daughters reach eighteen years of age and in the meantime, have to make continuous
investments raising daughters while trying for a “son” instead of aborting them earlier
and try for a “son”. Wealth constrained parents cannot continue to invest in their
daughters and over time, these female children die because of negligence or lack of
care or both.
Further, I find that death rates of male children have fallen post policy, implying
a spillover effect of these policies to a non-target group. Possibly, parents tend to
take more care of the male children as they expect to have only a certain number of
children, which, in turn, implies that the extent of son-preference has only gone up.
Spillover effect in case of sex-ratio had not been studied (Alfano et al. (2014) ) in the
context of cash transfer programs targeting to improve female to male sex ratio and
this paper contributes to the literature by showing such evidence5. The death rates
for the two sexes together imply that the mortality gap between male and female
children is now wider than before.
Section 2 describes the girl child protection schemes in India, section 3 reviews
the existing literature, section 4 discusses the econometric models used, section 5
describes the data, and section 6 discusses the result.
1.2 Background and Related Literature
Son preference in India has been a widely studied topic in the literature. The most
common cause of the existence of son-preference is identified as the patrilineal struc-
ture of the society where the descents occur through the male line from father to his
son(s). Such patrilineal system dictates that the sons will continue to bear the status
of the family and will inherit land, property, and wealth from his parents. Such pa-
trilineality plays an even larger role as local political power is transferred from father
5Spillover effects from conditional cash transfer programs have been found in the context of health and education
(Calderone, 2017; Guerrero et al., 2018)
6to their son and is important for the family to continue to rule in that area. Political
power, therefore, can be directly linked to sex ratio (Das Gupta et al., 2003) in an
area and female to male sex ratio will improve if parents could transfer their power to
their daughters. In an effort to increase women’s status in the society, Indian govern-
ment has reserved political seats for women at the regional level. Kalsi, 2017 studies
political reservation in India and has found such reservation has increased female to
male sex ratio at birth. Such empowerment has been found to have positive secondary
effect on child marriage (Castilla, 2018) - a key driver of patrilineal structure. Female
children are married off earlier so they learn to be submissive to the members of her
husband’s family. With prevalence of patriarchal family system in Northern India,
incidence of child marriage is also higher in Norther states . Child marriage varies
between 6 - 27.5% among Northern states whereas among Southern states it varies
between 0 - 16.1%. Moreover, North Indian women lack any autonomy in choosing
their husbands (Vanneman et al., 2012), which reflects low value of women in the
society. Women’s autonomy have been found to affect fertility behavior (Abadian,
1996; Balk, 1994), maternal health care utilization (Thapa and Niehof, 2013; Singh
et al., 2013; Sado et al., 2014). Women, after marriage, particularly in Northern In-
dia, gains some status if she is able to give birth of a son (Das Gupta et al., 2003).
As a consequence, women prefer having a son rather than having a daughter who will
be marginalized in the future, which in turn, reinforces the patriarchy in the family.
Inheritance of property rights has been one reason parents preferred having a son
than daughters. Therefore, equalization of property rights is likely to reduce the
persisting gender inequality in India, empower women in the society and therefore, it
may work as a plausible channel that leads to improvement in female to male sex ratio.
In the year 2005, Indian government has passed a law on equal inheritance rights for
daughters and son of the deceased6 and it has increased female education (Roy, 2015;
6Although Maharashtra, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka had modified the Hindu Succession
Act of 1956 to extend inheritance right to daughters. Hindu Succession Act (1956) established full property right of
women who owned a land, eliminating “limited right” of women. However, it was not until 2005, when an amendment
to the law allowed equal inheritance right to daughters as sons.
7Deininger et al., 2013). However, a recent notable study by Bhalotra et al., 2018 shows
that such empowerment has led to a fall in proportion of female children born. The
argument is that ,due to patrilocality, the social custom of daughters staying with her
husband’s family while sons staying with his own family, parents may be reluctant
to accept the daughter’s right over properties out of the fear that her in-laws will
exercise their control over family property . Moreover, they fear that daughters may
lawsuit parents over right if they exclude their daughters from property. Although
such possibility is rare, parents fear the worst and under risk-aversion, they eliminate
their daughters. It is not, therefore, certain whether female empowerment will lead to
an elimination of son-bias7. Arguably, such empowerment may reduce dowry payment
during the time of marriage, but such channels are overpowered by parent’s concern
about involuntary transfer of property rights to outside of the family.
Parents have exercised elimination of daughters before birth with the advent of
heath technology, referred to as ultrasound, which was intended to dictate defects in
the development of fetus. Abortion is legal in India and allows parents to eliminate
fetus before they reach 20 weeks, whereas the ultrasound can detect the sex of fetus
as early as 12 weeks of gestation (Anukriti, S and Bhalotra, Sonia R and Tam, Eddy
Hiu Fung, 2016). Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010 estimates that such use of ultrasound
for sex-selection has accounted for about 6 percent of the potential female childbirth8.
On the other hand, parents may deliberately reduce investment in children when they
learn the sex of the child, resulting higher pre-natal mortality or early death (Gupta,
1987; Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1990)9. Moreover,
since availing ultrasound and abortion are costly, such pre-natal sex-selection occur
more among the wealthier and more educated women (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010).
7Duflo, 2012 reviews the women’s empowerment literature in developing countries and discusses how it can affect
the gender gap between men and women.
8Abortion may occur even if there is no son-preference Anukriti, S and Bhalotra, Sonia R and Tam, Eddy Hiu
Fung, 2016 . 18% of pregnancies in United States 2017 ended in abortion ( Induced Abortion in the United States-
Guttmacher Institute- September 2019)
9Legalization of abortion is also a source of empowerment for women as they could remove unwanted birth. Since
women carry a disproportionate burden of pregnancy, such technology freed them from unwanted responsibilities.
Such empowerment has been beneficial for the next generations as parents keep only those children they want. For
example, see (Grossman and Joyce, 1990; Gruber et al., 1999; Kalsi, 2015).
8Poorer parents, however, resort to postnatal sex-selection either by continuing to bear
children until they achieve a boy (Bhalotra and Van Soest, 2008) as an alternative to
deliberate negligence of female children. Goodkind, 1996 argues that pre-natal and
post-natal sex selection are substitutes and therefore, female children who are born
in a family which can afford to terminate pregnancy based on the sex of the child are
likely to be taken care of as much as a male child.
The selection against female children is worsened by the current practice of dowry
which is closely related to the patrilineal tradition of society. As women were consid-
ered a part of her husband’s family after she is married and traditionally land and
other properties were considered to be inherited by sons, parents sometimes used to
gift precious jewelry, even a part of land as a means of her independent use. Especially,
she would use it to support her children and herself, in case her husband dies and had
not left any means of livelihood for them (Chatterjee, 2008). This was the traditional
form of dowry, which did not carry its present day connotation. However, feudal
system in India had completely restricted women from being a landowner.(Sreenivas,
2008). Thereafter, any gift from parents were kept with their husband, which had
turned into a custom that required bride’s parents to gift a sum of money that filled
the gap in their economic status10. Such custom is the form of dowry in the present
day, the failure of which are often associated to domestic violence against the bride
and their death (Dang et al., 2018). Associated with such risk, parents avert raising a
female child, which has contributed to the low female to male child sex ratio. Recent
literature has focused on this channel of sex selection. The data on dowry is limited
which restricts the scope of empirical studies on dowry11. A recent comprehensive
study by Anukriti et al., 2018 uses data from Rural Economic and Demographic Sur-
10Traditionally, women were assumed to be dependent on their husband and were “married-up” in the social scale.
This meant either they married into higher social caste or husband had a secure source of income. This gave the
groom’s side the power to negotiate sum of money that bride’s family has to gift to them so she is accepted into the
family. Although Inter-caste marriage is still not completely acceptable to the families who belong to the upper class.
11Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (2006) in India reports actual payment by bride and grooms in a
marriage. Also, it collects information on savings of both sides in financial institution, in jewelry etc. Indian Human
Development Survey (IHDS) only reports total marriage expenditure. International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) survey reports retrospect marriage data from only six southern states in India in 1983.
Status of women and fertility ( conducted in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Phillipines during 1993-94) is
another data source for dowry payment but data is only categorical.
9vey (2006) to contribute to the empirical literature on dowry payment and finds that
per-capita household savings increase and fathers work more after having a female
child on the first birth. In an indirect effort to support parents to pay part of the
dowry and to keep the female children alive, states in India have taken female children
protection schemes, which pay a large cash transfer if parents fulfill certain conditions.
These are discussed in the next section.
1.3 Girl Children Protection Schemes in India
Over the past few decades, the government of India has been looking at the issue
of low female to male child sex ratio carefully. The discrimination against female
children takes place both in the form of pre-birth and post-birth. In an attempt to
address this issue, both the central (Federal) government and the state governments
have started several schemes which are aimed to increase the sex ratio at birth and
promote the survival of girl children. There are 17 schemes currently in 17 states
which are stated to primarily target the sex ratio by offering cash incentive against
keeping the girl unmarried till 18 years and other conditions. The cash incentive is
offered to increase the value of the girl children. As described in Table 1.1, they were
initiated in different years. The schemes have multiple objectives such as to reduce sex
selection, stop infanticide, improve access to education and healthcare, eliminate child
marriage, and reduce teenage pregnancy. The cash incentive paid is often restricted
to two girl children with a cap on the total number of children. For some schemes,
parents are required to accept sterilization after births of two children. Furthermore,
final cash transfer is made to the girl children only after they have reached 18 years of
age and remain unmarried (Sekhar, 2010). Parents have to enroll their girl children
with necessary supporting documents within a certain period after they are born and
a fixed deposit account is opened in the name of the girl children that matures when
these children reach 18 years of age.
These schemes provide cash incentives to offset the cost of raising a girl. In par-
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ticular, most of these schemes offer a large sum of money (about $1500 - $2000,
equivalent of Rs.1Lakh) after they turn 18, the legal age of marriage in India. Given
the monthly per capita consumer expenditure being Rs. 1430 (Approx $22) in the
rural areas and Rs. 2630 (Approx $40) (NSSO 68th round) in the urban areas, the
offered amount can at least offset the actual expenditure made on the children until
they turn 18. A common misconception in society is that since females are to be
married off, they are a burden to the family and do not add to the wealth of the
family. Given this attitude, they are often withdrawn from school early in their life
as it is believed that it is difficult to find a suitor for marriage for the girl if they
are more learned. When they stay home instead, they can contribute to household
chores, which is also considered as her training to keep her ’own’ house in order after
they leave parents’ home to stay with her in-laws. Many of these schemes also offer
financial incentives to the parents on a monthly or yearly basis for enrolling them
in school,however, those financial incentives are smaller compared to the final sum.
The other condition that needs to be fulfilled in most of these schemes is to restrict
the number of children to three or less with no more than two girls. Parents of the
children enrolled in some schemes are required to undergo sterilization after they have
reached the limit stipulated by a scheme, or in some cases, before they register for
the schemes. For example, Bhagyalakshmi Scheme in Karnataka allows an enrolled
couple to have 3 children and the benefits are offered to at most two girls out of
the three children. On the birth of the third child, either of the parents has to go
through sterilization. Among some other basic conditions, almost all the schemes re-
quire parents to register the birth of the children and some require them to complete
immunization. Tables 1.2 list these additional conditions for each scheme.
Tamil Nadu, a southern state in India, introduced such a girl child protection
scheme in the year 1992, which was the oldest CCT girl child protection scheme run-
ning in India. It was introduced in response to the falling sex ratio that was noticed
in the 1991 census. Rajasthan, another northern state suffering from a similar issue,
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had introduced a policy back in 1992 which was discontinued in the year 2005. An-
other northern state, Haryana, had a similar policy running from 1994 to 1998 and
then again from 2004 till now. Between the years 1997- 2005, Indian government
ran a centrally sponsored scheme, Balika Samriddhi Yojana, which provided similar
incentives to the parents to support girl children. However, the scheme was discon-
tinued by the central (federal) government following a massive lack of promotion and
enrollment in the scheme and state governments were directed to have their schemes.
The beneficiaries of the schemes were continued to be given the promised sum regu-
larly, however, no new application was accepted. Around 2005, several states started
their schemes with far more attractive incentives compared to the one offered by the
central government. The introduction of these policies over time had some state and
time variation which provided a basis for a difference in difference framework. Figure
1 shows the introduction and availability of schemes over the states and years.
The issue of son-bias is an old one in India and is a prominent phenomenon in
Northern India. The earliest state-sponsored cash transfer policy addressing this
issue was laid out by Tamil Nadu in 1992. Starting in 2005, CCT schemes became
widespread as a number of states undertook similar CCTs in different years. However,
there was only one centrally (Federally) sponsored scheme which was implemented
in 11 blocks of 7 states on a pilot basis. These 7 states were considered to be lag-
ging behind the rest of the country and were identified as ‘Backward’ in terms of
human development outcomes (Bank, 2018). While a few studies (Sinha and Yoong,
2009; Srinivasan and Bedi, 2011; Anukriti, 2018) examine individual state-sponsored
schemes to see if they have improved the sex ratio, there is no study looking at
whether the sex ratio at birth has improved due to these state-sponsored programs
on a national scale and the latest census figures attesting to declining child sex ratio
despite the availability of these schemes enforces the research question whether these
schemes are effective in improving female to male child sex ratio.
A recent study byAnukriti (2018), which looks at a policy in Haryana in contrast to
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a synthetic control group, finds that the program reduced the overall fertility rate, but
was unable to improve the birth ratio, possibly because the enrolled parents wanted a
son within the limited number of children they can have. Moreover, it indicated that
such a policy has unintended consequence of decreasing sex ratio for the first birth,
which was previously shown to be random (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Pörtner,
2015). Adding to the literature, using the variation in the timing of the introduction
of these policies, we get a natural control group- the states without such policies.
The consequences of skewed sex ratio have also been studied in the context of
the marriage market (Angrist, 2002) which indicates men find it difficult to find a
prospective wife. While a surplus of men is shown to be positively correlated to crime
(Edlund, Lena and Li, Hongbin and Yi, Junjian and Zhang, Junsen, 2013, 2007),
the findings have been mixed (Kaur, 2013). Srinivasan and Bedi (2011) uses data
from Vital Events Survey to estimate a reduction in pre-birth daughter elimination
and post-birth mortality in girl children in Tamil Nadu between the years 1996-
1999 and 2003. While the study does not focus on the causal impact of a scheme,
it reports a causal effect of having a number of similar schemes compared to a few
within districts in Tamil Nadu and they find that districts with multiple schemes were
successful in improving sex-ratio at birth. The cash transfer scheme Tamil Nadu had
been strengthened in terms of cash payment which may have played a partial role in
the birth ratio improvement. In another study, Sinha and Yoong (2009) look at the
impact of another state-sponsored program in Haryana on the child-sex ratio of each
mother in the state and desired fertility. While improvement in sex ratio testifies to
the success of the program, it does not reveal whether sex-selection occur at earlier
births or report whether number of girls that a mother had given birth has improved
for each age. Another stream of literature looks at the availability of technology
that reveals the sex of the fetus. The widespread availability of sex-determination
technique of the fetus and ubiquity of illegal abortion affects the survival of girl-fetus
negatively. Perhaps the most widely cited study Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) show
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that after the arrival of the Pre-Natal Diagnostic Technique (PNDT), chances of a
girl being born after first birth falls compared to the pre-PNDT period. The study
takes into account the sex of previously born children and therefore, clearly shows
evidence of sex-selection at each birth order. Nandi and Deolalikar (2013) show that
a legal ban on PNDT could prevent the child sex-ratio to go down any further.
As shown in Table 1.1, there are about twenty CCT programs in India (Sekhar,
2010) which aim to provide long term support to the girl children starting from the
birth of the girl till she gets married. My objective in this paper is to see if these
policies, taken by different states at various time points, are successful in improving
the birth sex ratio in India. Since most of these policies are taken recently, their
long-run effects on marriage and health are not possible to evaluate.
In the foreign context, China’s one-child policy stands closest to India’s state-
sponsored policies. China’s one child policy, although was initiated by its national
government during the 70’s, there were variations in the number of children one can
have and the penalties associated in exceeding them depending on regions, provinces,
and ethnicity (Li and Zhang, 2017, 2007). Ebenstein (2010) exploited the regional
variation in the penalties to identify the effect of the policy and found that regions
with higher penalties had a lower level of fertility. However, these regions also showed
a fall in the sex ratio, testifying fertility-sex ratio trade off. In our context, most
policies place a restriction on the number of children and the combination of sex
allowed and hence, it is critical that we examine both the questions carefully. In
the context of Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Mexico, Conditional Cash Transfer
policies aimed at improving educational attainment(Alam et al., 2011; Chaudhury
and Parajuli, 2007; Acharya and Luitel, 2006 Khandker et al., 2003; Schultz, 2004).
Conditional Cash Transfer policies are also found to be effective in improving the
health of children in a randomized control trial in Mexico (Gertler, 2004). In India,
Conditional Cash Transfer programs for mothers was introduced in 2005 which was
conditioned on mother delivering their babies in a health facility, which was found
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to be successful but the success varied across states (Lim et al., 2010). Cash transfer
policies are also found to be effective in reducing inequality in Brazil, Chile, and
Mexico (Soares et al., 2009).
This paper aims to make the following contribution. It evaluates the effect of
introduction of state-sponsored conditional cash transfer policies aimed at partially
subsidizing the cost of girl children in various points of time in India on the birth
ratio and their combined effect on overall fertility rate. While it does not aim for
evaluation of any particular state policy, it looks into whether, on an average, they
could influence the chances of survival of girl children at birth and solve the puzzle
of declining sex-ratio at birth.
The following sections explain the empirical model, the data used, and some pre-
liminary results.
1.4 Model
The empirical specification for estimating the effect of adopting girl children protec-
tion scheme is given by
femaleijt = α+ β1I(BirthOrder 1)i × I(Policy)jt + β2I(BirthOrder 2)i × I(Policy)jt +
β3I(BirthOrder 1)i + β4I(Policy)jt + β5I(BirthOrder 2)i + γXijt + µt + λj + εijt............(1),
where femaleijtdenotes the i−th child born in state j in year t . I(BirthOrder 1)i
is an indicator for the child being of birth order of 1. Similarly, I(BirthOrder 2)i
is an indicator for birth order 2 and I(Policy)jt is an indicator for thej-th state
having a policy at time t. Xijt is a set of control variables such as age of mother,
age of the child,age of mother at child birth, indicator for the religion of the child,
and an indicator for mother having at least secondary education. Neither DHS or
DLHS ask for the income of the household but provide a wealth index which capture
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the condition of living. Since I combine different surveys, it will be incorrect to use
the wealth index as they are not comparable. Instead, I put an indicator for the
household having a car, an indicator for the household head being a female, if the
location of the household is in the urban area, whether the household has a toilet,
and an indicator for the household having electricity. β1 and β2 are our coefficients
of primary interest which are identified using difference-in-difference method. The
control groups are birth order of three and above and state without a girl child
protection scheme in year t. They show whether states which have adopted girl child
protection schemes have female birth at order one and two respectively, compared to
the third and above birth order children and those states which have not adopted any
girl child protection schemes. Furthermore, β4 shows whether the policy had been
helpful in influencing the overall female birth in the treated states compared to the
control states. Additionally, the specification includes, µt, time fixed effects, and λj
which are state fixed effects. Finally, εijt denotes an error term.
1.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use phases IV (1998-99), V (2005- 06), and VII (2015-16) of Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) and round 3 (2008) of District Level Household Survey (DLHS)
data. DHS is a cross-sectional household level survey conducted by the International
Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) in India and is more popularly known as Na-
tional Family Health Surveys (NFHS). They are targeted towards covering detailed
information on health, fertility history, and nutrition for women aged 15-49 and on
vaccinations and illness of their children. They also collect basic characteristics of
households. They surveyed 92,486 households in 26 states in 1998, 109,041 house-
holds from 29 states in 2004-05, and in 2016, they interviewed 601,509 households
covering 29 states and 7 union territories. For each household, it collects demographic
information including age, sex, education, and religion of each member along with
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characteristics of the household such as - source of drinking water, type of house,
type of toilet, source of light. For ever-married women between age 15-49, the survey
ask for information about each birth along with the birth year, the order of birth,
and sex of the child and if the child is alive. For each phase, I focus on births that
occurred in the last five years prior to the interview date so as to rule out women
who had completed their birth history long ago. Since there was no NFHS survey
between 2005 and 2015, I use DLHS round III for births between 2005-09. DLHS
data is akin to NFHS data except unlike NFHS, it identifies the district in which each
household belongs. It surveys 1000 households from each district in all the states.
Round III of DLHS, completed during 2007-09 reports that occurred in the last five
years. DLHS round IV was carried out during 2012-13, however, it did not survey
seven states as they were already included in a contemporary longitudinal health sur-
vey known as Annual Health Survey (AHS). The questionnaire of AHS did not ask
for the information required to combine them with earlier rounds of NFHS or DLHS.
Therefore, using data from NFHS and DLHS, I created state-year panel data which I
subsequently merged with the household and mother characteristics of the children.
I restrict the data to 1996, as this is the year when a law against determination of sex
of fetus was passed and therefore births before 1996 are more likely to have a larger
reporting bias against girl children.
It is important to mention that none of the surveys report an annual income of
households. Both NFHS and DLHS surveys create a wealth index instead, using
an array of household characteristics. However, the wealth indices reported across
surveys may not be directly comparable. As an alternative, I use basic characteristics
of households such as the location of house, having electricity, and having a car
to indicate their wealth level. Both NFHS and DLHS collect information on these
indicators.
I use a range of useful outcome variables. For sex-ratio, I use an indicator for a
female child. For the analysis of the prevalence of mortality among children, I cre-
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ated an indicator each for death before one month, one year, and five years using
the month and year of death of a child. For childcare, I use indicators for receipt
of various vaccines and whether they had been breastfed, respectively. While several
interesting outcomes for breastfeeding are used with NFHS data (Jayachandran and
Kuziemko, 2011), the lack of uniformity between NFHS and DLHS data does not
allow me to create such variables. For vaccinations, however, a number of variables
could be collated from NFHS and DLHS. In particular, I use indicators for receiv-
ing vaccinations against Tuberculosis, Measles, and Diphtheria. NFHS asks if the
recent two births were vaccinated against several diseases while DLHS collects such
information for most recent birth only. The importance of receiving these vaccines in
India is described in the corresponding results section. Finally, I analyze the receipt
of vitamin A tablets.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the descriptive statistics of the data. In Table (3), I divide
the sample of mothers into two groups- one for those who gave at least one birth after
a policy was introduced in her state of residence and another is a group in which
mothers have not given any birth after introduction of policy. There are 265,449
mothers who did not give birth after a state had a policy and 142,377 mothers who
had at least one birth post policy period. Since parents are unable to alter their
decision for having children that they took before the introduction of these policies,
this is one way to see if the distributions of boys and girls born in the pre and post-
policy periods, respectively, were different. Column (3) shows the difference between
columns (1) and (2). Among mother, who gave births only in the pre-policy period,
72.17 percent had a female child about 71.31 percent of mothers who had at least
one child had at least one female child. Looking at similar percentages of mothers
who carried a male child, the numbers were 76.09 and 74.61, respectively, implying a
significant fall by 1.48 percentage points. The fall in the percentage of mothers having
a male child is larger than the percentage of mothers who had a female child, which
may indicate there was a change in the trend of having a female child. Seen another
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way, the total number of children born falls from 2.41 per mother to 2.25 per mother,
out of which there were 1.2 and 1.14 girls, respectively. Clearly, the fall in average
number of male children was larger than the fall in the number of female children,
implying the ratio of female to male children has improved in post-policy era. A
fall in the total number of children can be attributed to these policies placing an
upper limit on the number of children the parents can have or because mothers who
had given birth only in the pre-policy era had already completed their childbearing
history. Both birth and death for boys and girls fell significantly in the post policy
years. The average age of mothers in post-policy years is higher, they are more likely
to have electricity in their household, however, are less likely to be educated.
Table (4) summarizes the data in a different way. In column (1), I have mothers
who had their first child in the pre-policy period and in column (2), The idea is
to compare the distribution of girls and boys born mothers who knew about the
existence of such policies before their first pregnancy to those who did not. I have
mothers who had their first child in the post-policy period. There was a fall the
proportion of mothers who have a male child and a female child, respectively and
average number of children born to each mother falls by around 50 percent. Also, it
shows the average number of female children born to a mother falls proportionately
more than the average number of male children born. While this way of summarizing
indicates female to male sex ratio has fallen, it should be noted that the sample of
mothers in column (2) is substantially smaller than column (1). Comparing figures
from Tables (4) and (5), it is difficult to have a clear direction of movement of female
to male child sex ratio. Therefore, I turn to econometric analysis for models described
in section 4.
The data for policies came from various sources. Sekhar (2010) reports condi-
tional cash transfer policies up to 2010. For such policies introduced after 2010, I rely
on reports from each state’s directorate of women and child development or similar
departments. These administrative units are responsible for formulating rules and
19
regulations for welfare of women and children in the society (“Ministry of Women
and Child Development”) and they work with local government bodies and non-
government organizations to ensure implementation of these rules. Since documen-
tation of these policies is often not well maintained, I also make use of various other
sources (vikaspedia.in) to gather the data on the year of initiation, conditions of these
policies, and values of transfer amount. The availability and year of initiation of these
policies are shown in Figure 1. Table (1) describes the period during which a policy
was active in its state(s), restrictions on the date of birth of a child to be considered
for the policies, and restriction on the number of children and the allowed composition
of their sexes. Table (2) further describes the conditions to be fulfilled to obtain the
terminal amount.
1.6 Effect on Female Birth
In this section, I present the main result for the paper- effect of the cash incentives
on the female birth.I estimate equation (1) and the results are presented in Table 5.
The validity of a difference-in-differences model depends on a well-defined control
group, which I examine in Figure 2. Parallel trend assumption, in this case will be
satisfied if, in absence of policies, the female to male sex ratio at birth in the treated
states remains parallel to the sex ratio at birth in the control states. Children are
categorized according to their order of birth with third and above birth is consolidated
into a single group and is a control group. Figure (2) shows the average proportion
of female children born at birth order one, two, and higher, respectively, over states.
In the horizontal axis shows the number of years elapsed from the introduction of
the policy. The average proportion of girl children born in the year of introduction
of policy is shown at zero. I plot the average proportion of female children at birth
during a window of 10 years, 5 years before policy initiation to 5 years after. For birth
order three and above, the proportion of girl children has remained roughly constant
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both before and after the year of policy initiation which ascertains that third and
higher birth order is a valid control group for equation (1).
In the ’before’ periods, proportion of female children at birth orders one, two, and
above move very closely, between 0.47 and 0.48, while in the ’after’ periods, average
female births show a sharp increase at birth order one. Starting from just below
48%, female births stay close to 48.5% on an average, reaching a maximum of 49.2%
approximately after 3 years of passage of policies. For birth order two, there are
some improvements, but in relatively later years. The average female birth fluctuates
from year to year considerably. This is likely due to the fact that survey data are
not representative of the births every year. To compare the periods before and after
policy take up in states that have adopted the policies, I plot a similar graph for
states adopting policies in Figure 3. Trend of female birth at different orders is very
close to each other to the left of zero. To the right of zero, they show the same
pattern as in Figure 2. Taken together, these plots may indicate that the observed
rise in female births follows from states with policies and the effects of these policies
are more pronounced after a few years of initiation. In the Indian context, the flow
of information from administrative level to the general population, the incentive of
local political parties in power, and the level of complexity in enrolling in the policy-
all play a role in determining the success of these policies. Gupta (2017) finds that
the treated group in a randomized control trial, who were offered aid to fill up the
application forms, had higher percentage of enrollment into a policy. These state level
policies are often promoted by the ruling party in their respective states. However,
if oppositions are ruling at the local level of government, such promotions may not
reach people in those areas.
To see whether the observed increase in the proportion of female births was sig-
nificant, I estimate equation (1) and report the results in Table 5.
Column (1) estimates equation (1) with only time-invariant state fixed effects and
state-invariant time fixed effects. The estimate shows that there are about 15 more
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girl children born, per 1000 boys at birth order 1, on average, in states with policies,
compared to states without policies and at birth order 3 or above. The estimate is
significant at 1%. At birth order 2, 10 more girl children are born for every 1000
boys, an estimate which is also significant at 1% level. However, the estimates of
female births at order one and two, without interacting with the post variable, show
that, at both birth orders, the proportion of girls is not significantly different from the
proportion of girls born at order 3 and above. While this is a little counter-intuitive
given evidence of higher sex selection at higher birth order, the column does not yet
control for any time and state varying characteristics, which may be correlated to
births at order 1 or 2. For example, if women belonging to families where female
children are valued less than male children have their first child at an older age are
more likely to sex select on early births compared to younger mothers coming from
similar families.
In column (2) , I control for a number of mother and household characteristics,
which are likely to be correlated with sex-selection at different birth orders. The
interaction terms show there are 17 more girl children born per 1000 birth at order
1 and about 11 more girl children born at birth order 2. These are really large
impacts on female births. The smaller coefficient for interaction with birth order
2 may indicate that larger sex selection at higher birth order still prevails. The
indicators for birth order 1 and 2 are larger compared to column (1) and (2), yet
insignificant. The post variable is negative and significant as in column (1) and neither
the coefficient nor its standard error are different, which may imply the absence of
correlation between female birth at higher order at post policy period and variation
among various household and mother characteristics. The coefficient implies there is
one percentage point fall in the proportion of female children at higher birth order
after the policies were introduced in states, after controlling for changes at birth order
one and two. The effect may be due to those mothers who already had more than 3
children as stipulated by the policies when the policies were introduced and showed
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no change in the attitude towards female births. Further, in column (3), I put a state-
specific linear trend to rule out any state-specific movements not already captured
by the state fixed effects. This is the most saturated form of equation (1) in which
estimate and the coefficients are virtually unchanged. Finally, I restrict the sample
to 17 states where policies were ever introduced. The coefficients are slightly smaller
and interestingly, pre- policy average effects for female births are positive, significant,
and show an increasing trend at order 1 and 2, respectively. Finally, I focus on the
total effect of a policy on female birth. I fail to reject the hypothesis that there is no
change in the sex ratio at birth as shown by the last two rows in the table. The total
effect is negligible and statistically insignificant. This indicates that, even after ten
years of the policies, the sex ratio at birth has not improved.
1.6.1 Heterogeneity
I explore heterogeneity in the female birth in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7. I start by
dividing the sample between those children who had electricity and those who did
not. Electricity has been widely used as a measure of income growth (Henderson et al.
(2012)). It appears that proportion of birth increase at order 1 is 2 percentage points
and at birth order 2, the increase is about 1 percentage point. In contrast, there is no
increase in the proportion of births at either of these birth orders, when families do
not have electricity. Other indicators of income such as toilet availability, having a
car, and living in an urban area show some significant increase in female birth when
the sample is dichotomized in a similar manner. However, sub-samples that have
these characteristics show stronger effect of policies. It appears that positive effect
of policies were stronger for families that have higher socioeconomic status. When
the sample were divided by the religion of the household head, results appear to be
stronger for being a Hindu household and not being a Muslim or Christian household.
These results raises the questions whether policies were systematically allocated to
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higher income areas or areas that are resided by Hindus and thereby, whether policy
take up was related to unobservable characteristics of an area. I address this concern
in section 8. After controlling for certain covariates, treated children do not appear to
be significantly belonging to household with electricity or to those household, whose
head is a Hindu. Finally, female births appear have increased significantly more in
male-headed household.
Sex-selection against female children is associated to income of the families and
religion. As the literature indicates (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Edlund, Lena
and Li, Hongbin and Yi, Junjian and Zhang, Junsen, 2007), families belonging to
higher income categories are more likely to have induced abortion, possibly because
of their financial ability to know the sex of the fetus. Similarly, there is a religion-
gradient toward son-preference. According to 2011 census of India, 79.8% population
were Hindus, 14.23% were Muslims, and 2.30% were Christians - these three religion
together make up about 96% of the population. According to Islamic law, fetal sex-
selection is not considered unlawful as long as they are done through medical means
(Schenker (2002)) 12 In contrast to Islamic doctrine, Hinduism is build on multitude of
beliefs so it is difficult to conclude that Hindu beliefs support or oppose sex-selection.
However, regardless of its strand of beliefs, males were considered more important
than females as evidenced in the Veda, the oldest text on Hinduism. In one of its
hymns, it is stated that women experience happiness from her sons and post- wedding
rituals are performed so she that is blessed with a son (Sineath, 2004). Backed by
these religious underpinning, son-preference is therefore more likely to prevail among
Hindus.
12Such techniques are known as Preimplantation Diagnosis (PGD) or Sperm Separation by Flow Cytometry
(Schenker, 2002).
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1.7 Post Natal Outcomes & Prevalence of Son-Preference
1.7.1 Mortality Rates of Children
For poorer part of the society, discrimination between sexes is common after birth
of a child. Parents may focus on the male children and invest in their human capi-
tal while female children contribute to the household work and farming. Moreover,
families tend to allocate more nutrition and healthcare to male children (Pande and
Yazbeck (2003)). In effect, female children are less likely to survive compared to male
children. Reducing child mortality rate is one of the Millennium Development Goals
and has been a long concern for policymakers in developing countries. India has
shown moderate improvement in reducing child death over the past decades (United
Nations, 2010). However, under-five mortality rate has historically remained higher
for female children in India. Female death in India was 108 per 1000 live births in the
1990s whereas male death rate was 97 per 1000 live births. The figures reduced to 82
deaths per 1000 live births for females and 74 deaths per 1000 live births for males
in 2000 (Sawyer, 2012)13. The substantial difference in death rate for both sexes is
contributed to the high mortality of children under 1 year 14.
Therefore, it is natural to ask whether cash incentives were effective in reducing
the difference in mortality rates of the two sexes or, in other words, were effective in
decreasing the death rates for female children for whom the cash transfers were offered.
I use the following difference-in-difference-in-differences specification to estimate the
effect of policy on female children at birth order one and two on death rates before
one month, one year, and five years.
Yijt = α+β1I(Order 1)iPostjtI(female)i+β2I(Order 2)iPostjtI(female)i+β3I(Order 1)iI(female)i+
β4PostjtI(female)i + β5I(Order 2)iI(female)i + β6Postjt + β7I(Order 1)iPostjt + β8I(Order 2)iPostjt +
β9I(Order 1)i + β10I(Order 2)i + β11I(female)iγ +Xijt + µt + λj + εijt............(2)
Yijt is an outcome variable for child i , born in state j,in the year t, which in
13The mortality rates were estimated for 131 countries in Sawyer (2012) using UN population prospects (2010
revisions). The figures here are obtained from their estimates for India.
14For infant mortality rate between 1-4 years, female deaths were 38 and 26 (per 1000 live births) in 1990 and 2010,
respectively, compared to male death of 27 and 19 (per 1000 live births) in 1990 and 2000, respectively.
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this context is an indicator if the child is dead before a certain age. Each of the
two triple difference terms is an interaction among birth order of the i-th child, the
Postjt variable which indicates whether there was a policy in state j in year t, and
I(female), an indicator for a female child. The omitted categories are birth order 3
or higher and the male children. Control variables used are the same as in equation
1.
I start by looking at death before one month in Table 1.8. In column (1), I only have
state and time fixed along with the twice-difference and level terms. The death rate
for female children goes up by 0.03 percentage points at birth order 1. In column (2), I
add several household and mother level characteristics. The results indicate that post-
policy, death before one month has increased for female children by 0.3 percentage
points, about ten-fold increase compared to column (1). I find similar estimate when
I add a state-specific linear trade, in column (3). There is no significant change in
the death of female children at birth order 2. The interaction terms of birth order
and post-policy show the change in death rate for the male children at early births
compared to male children at higher birth order. At birth order 1, male children are
0.63 percentage points less likely to be reported dead compared to male children at
order 3 and above. Adding a linear trend indicates a fall by 0.69 percentage points
after policies were taken. The differential that existed between higher-order male
children and male children at order 1 in terms of neonatal death, is now smaller.
However, the same is not true for girl children. Female children are 0.25 percentage
points more likely to be reported dead at birth order 1 compared to male children
at order 1 and on an average, after policies were taken, higher order female children
are 0.24 percentage points more likely to be reported dead compared to higher order
male children, implying that the neonatal death rate differential between female and
male children has increased. If there were a general improvement in neonatal care,
death rate of both female and male children should have fallen post policy. When
I restrict the sample to policy enacting states, the direction of the estimates do not
26
change while the absolute values are larger.
As neonatal deaths are noisy due to several reasons including mother’s prenatal
health condition and possible adverse conditions during birth of the child, I further
look at the death before one year in Table 1.9. I restrict the data to those children
who survived at least one month. There is no significant change in the death of female
children at birth order 2 but there is 0.28 percentage points increase in the death rate
of female children at birth order 1. Male children are less likely to die compared to
their higher order counterpart. When restricted to only policy states, coefficients are
larger in absolute terms.
Finally, in Table 1.10, I have a similar analysis for death within 5 years of birth.
I restrict attention to those children who had survived at least one year, thereby
considering death between one and five years of age. For a fully specified model,
I report the estimate in column (3), I observe a significant 0.18 percentage points
increase in the death of female children at birth order 1 and birth order 2. Estimates
are larger at both birth orders when the sample is restricted to policy states in column
(4). However, in contrast to one-month and one-year death rates for male children at
order 1, I observe a small yet significant increase in the death rates for male children
at that birth order by 0.05 percentage points. However, when restricted to only policy
states, the coefficient is not different from zero. However, even in this case, increase
in male deaths do not rule out preferential care of parents towards the male children
as the coefficient is approximately one-fourth of the increase in death rates for female
children. It could be that the death of male children could not be avoided by the
parents, despite their best efforts.
The results for death rates consistently suggest that male children at early birth
orders benefited rather than the female children, for whom the policies were directed.
Female death rates unambiguously goes up for children of all ages. What remains a
concern is an increase in the death rates for male children within one to five years.
I turn the attention to vaccination outcomes for children to find a possible expla-
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nation for such increase in death rates for both sexes that may indicate a possible
deterioration of the healthcare system.
1.7.2 Effect of Policies on Child Care
Immunization schedules require children to be vaccinated before 1 year in India (Min-
istry of Health and Family Welfare, 2017), which is often neglected15. Laxminarayan
and Ganguly (2011) estimate there are fewer than 44% of India’s young children who
receive the full schedule of immunization. NHFS and DLHS both collect information
about immunization of children. Except for NFHS-2, all rounds of NFHS collected
vaccination history of all births in the last five years from the date of interview. In
NFHS-2 ( 1998-99) and DLHS-3, vaccination history of only the last two births was
collected. Both the surveys ask first for a vaccination card or a health card, which
is issued when the child receives a vaccine or obtains health care service in a health
facility. If the respondent can present a vaccination card for the child, the surveyors
note the relevant dates for vaccinations received by the child. If not, then surveyors
ask the respondents if they can recall the child having received different vaccines. A
typical round of these surveys asks whether vaccinations against Tuberculosis, Polio,
Diphtheria, and Measles are received. I use equation 2 to examine if female children
were left out disproportionately from receiving necessary healthcare. Here, Yijt is an
outcome variable for child i ,born in state j,in the year t, which in this context is an
indicator if the child had received a certain vaccine. The outcome variables are binary
(1 if yes and 0 if no). Additionally, I also look at whether a child has received vitamin
A tablets and whether they had been breastfed. I report the estimation results in
Table 1.11. Each column in Table 1.11 has two sub-columns. Sub-column (1) is for
all states in the sample and sub-column (2) is only for the policy enacting states.
Column (1) shows results for receiving BCG, a vaccination against Tuberculosis
(TB). I do not find any significant effect for the triple difference term for birth -order
15It is difficult to estimate what percent of children were vaccinated timely as our data is very limited due to largely
absent vaccination history of children. Surveys resorted to asking yes/no for each type of vaccination.
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1 using the full sample. However, at birth order 2, there is evidence of a fall in
vaccination of female children born post-policy era compared to boys. The margin is
1.6 percentage points smaller compared to male children even though both children
of both sexes suffer from a lower rate of vaccination. As indicated in Table 1.10, this
could be one channel which increased the death rate of children between 1 to 5 years,
regardless of their sexes. However, female children at early birth orders are more
likely to miss vaccination than male children at these birth orders. For policy abiding
states, vaccination after policy introduction for female children at birth order one and
two are smaller compared to male children at post-policy period. For measles and
diphtheria, coefficients remain largely significant for the interaction between birth
order and post variable and have the same negative sign. Looking at results vitamin
A intake, I find similar declines for male children post-policy period. However, female
children do not appear to have experienced any larger decline in receiving vaccinations
against measles and diphtheria or in receiving vitamin A16 17. A possible cause for
the fall in vaccination is that state financing of these policies is taking away the focus
from immunization related programs.
The final column in this table shows results about breastfeeding. Breastfeeding
is considered to be one of the most important sources of nutrients for the newborns.
However, parents may choose to breastfeed children differentially based on its sex if
son -preference is strong (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011). I do not find female
children were breastfed less than their male counterparts, even if they are born in
the post-policy era. Birth order fixed effects are positive and significant for both first
and second-order male children which mean that at first two order, male children are
breastfed more than the male children at higher birth orders. This behavior is also
16
From a policy perspective, this is important as India already carries the burden of one-fourth of the total TB cases
around the world while Measles and Diphtheria are equally widespread (Murhekar, 2017,Vaidya, 2015). During the
sample period in this paper, there were seven outbreaks of Diphtheria and most reported cases were found to be
unvaccinated against the disease. Median age for these cases were five years or older suggesting lack of immunization
affected older children more, possibly due to lack of Diphtheria booster dose, which is expected to be very low.
17Furthermore, until 2008, India implemented only one dose of the measles vaccine and was the only country among
193 countries under World Health Organization. All other nations implemented two doses of measles. A recent case
study in Pune, a city in Maharashtra, found that 40% of the infected measles patients were only had one dose.
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supported by the literature. Jayachandran and Pande (2015) show that eldest sons
are allocated more resources than their younger siblings. I find breastfeeding for male
children at order one and two both decrease in the post-policy era, as shown by the
interaction terms between the birth orders and the post variable but I do not observe
any differential treatment for female children. Overall, the results suggest that there
could be a shift of state attention from essential healthcare, possibly contributing to
the increase in death before five years for female and male children alike, and added
with ‘son-preference’ of parents, female children fall behind in the race of survival.
1.7.3 Spillover Effect on Male Children
Although these cash transfer policies are only for the female children, I find male
children are 0.7 - 0.9 percentage points less likely to die at birth order one and
about 0.2 - 0.26 percentage points less likely to die at the birth order 2. Since these
policies were only directed towards the female children and not the male children, this
may imply that the existing son-preference has led to spillover of the benefits to the
male children. One possible argument for such result is that in presence of monetary
incentive, parents are now keeping their female children alive and have a larger family,
possibly with male children. However, the policies are only paying after the female
children have reached 18 years of age. In the meantime, everything else constant, the
wealth level of the families remain the same, while there are more children to take
care of. Faced with the budget constraint, parents allocate more resources to the male
children as the marginal return of such investment is larger and let female children
die. The effects are very prominent for death before one month and death before one
-year. Although the five-year mortality rate for male children also increases, increase
in death rate for female children is about four-times the increase in death rate of male
children. Looking at different child vaccination outcomes in Table 1.11, there is a mild
evidence for a larger decline for female children as shown by Tuberculosis vaccination
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(BCG). After controlling for state-year fixed effects for vaccination outcomes and
death rates in Table 1.15 & Table 1.14, respectively, the estimates continue to remain
significant and validate a larger disparity in child-care and mortality between two
sexes. Therefore, it is possible that states failed to continue maintaining same level of
healthcare before these policies were taken and under a stringent healthcare system,
combined with wealth constraint, families prioritize care for male children, leaving
female children behind.
To support the argument for such spillover effects on male children under wealth
constraint, I divide the sample into a sub-sample of eight states that imposed a
maximum of two children (except three in one state) through sterilization and in
another sub-sample for rest of the nine states which did not impose any restriction
on the number of children. If the above reasoning is true, then it should only hold or
at least the effect should be stronger in those states where sterilization had not been
imposed as a policy condition, allowing the families to have male children further down
the birth order and therefore, have a larger family. I test this argument by looking
at the death rates for children in the states with sterilization (imposing states) and
without sterilization (non-imposing states) separately. The results are reported in
Table 1.12. Death rates before one month, one year, and five years - all show a
positive effects, significant at 5% for female children at birth order one, for states
which did not impose sterilization. For death before one-year and five-years, such
effects are present at birth-order two as well. For states which imposed sterilization,
such effects are largely absent, except for one-month mortality rate. Further, these
increments in death rates for female children in non-imposing state are accompanied
by a fall in male child death rate as evidenced by a 1.3 percentage point fall in one-
month mortality and 0.3 percentage points fall in one-year mortality rate at first
birth. While one-month mortality also goes down at birth-order one for imposing
states, such effects are more than double in non-imposing states. For imposing states,
such effects are completely absent for one-year and five-years mortality rates. This
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may suggest under wealth constraint, families in non-imposing states did not take
care of the female children as much as the male children due to their son-preference,
and hence there is an unintended spillover on the male children.
Spillover effects in cash transfer policies are not uncommon. Calderone, 2017
discussed the spillover effect of an youth employment program In Nigeria, which paid
cash to young males and female in a group for creation of start-up businesses without
any conditions. It is found that the money paid to males in the group is effective
in increasing educational expenditure of male while for females, such effects were
absent. The study argues that possibly female members of the group had to pay
male members a part of the allocated money due to re-distributive pressure such
as financial borrowings by others in the group. Csapo, 2017 studies the effect of
the spillover effects of a conditional cash transfer program in Brazil and finds that
Municipalities substitute away healthcare spending from primary care clinics, thereby
negatively affecting the children of the poor in that area. Guerrero et al., 2018 studies
Peruvian conditional cash transfer policy targeted to reduce the use of low quality
informal health care services and finds that the the policy affected the non-eligible
member of the treated households in the program. The effect of cash transfer policy
found in the context of sex-selection against female children is new and adds to the
literature on spillover effect of cash transfer policies.
1.8 Endogeneity Concern
Since the policies in different states were taken at different years, endogeneity issues
may arise due to contemporary policies taken. In fact, in 2005, The Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act was passed, which gave women equal right to property after their
parents die. This established daughter’s equal right on parent’s property as their sons.
This law was an amendment to the earlier Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which had
excluded daughter’s property rights. A number of studies have looked at the effect
on this law on socioeconomic outcomes. In our context, Bhalotra (2017) show that
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such property right equalization have led to increased foeticide in India, indicating
escalation of son-preference in the country. Any confounding factor that is already
not captured by the covariates and fixed effects used in the baseline specification will
have to be systematically associated with the variation in our double-difference terms.
As the law had affected control and treated states equally, the passage of this law
should not affect estimates, however, I extend my analysis to include a set of state-
year fixed effects so that I can eliminate endogeneity issues due to factors in a state in
a year but were invariant to birth-orders. The results are reported in Tables 13, 14,
and 15. Table 11 shows the results for female birth including state-year fixed effects.
The effect of the policies on the first and the second birth orders are approximately
the same, varying between 0.8 to 1.6 percentage points. The coefficient of post is
now significant and shows different signs in two columns. The interpretation of the
coefficient should be carefully considered as we have several state-birth year fixed
effects which are likely to be highly correlated to the post variable since both of them
vary at the state-year level.
Death rates of female children before one month, one year, and five years show
consistently negative effect of these policies at birth order one, which are reported
in Table 11. The first column for each mortality rate shows the estimates for the
complete sample while the second column restricts the sample to the states which
took the policy. At birth order 2, the coefficients are not significant for one month and
one year mortality rates but are significant for the 5 year mortality rates. Comparing
the size of the coefficients of the triple-difference interaction terms in Tables 6, 7,
and 8 with the the ones in Table 11, I find they are not much different and are
consistent whether I use a linear time trend or state-year time fixed effects. Further,
I continue to see a fall in the male death rates for one-month mortality rates and
one-year mortality rates, indicating a spillover effect of these policies.
In a similar manner, I estimate of the effects of these policies on the child care
variables as in Table 9. The results are reported in Table 12. The direction and size
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of the coefficients are similar. The effects on Tuberculosis vaccination continues to
show that female children were vaccinated less that the male children, after these
policies were taken. Moreover, after I control for state-birth year fixed effects, I find
vaccination against measles have fallen at birth order one. All other effects are similar
compared to Table 9.
A further concern is whether the policy take-up were related to states character-
istics which motivated the state governments to introduce them. Among the sample
states with policies, Haryana, Punjab, Delhi have shown worse sex ratio compared to
others.18 Northern states, as discussed in section 2, have shown stronger son prefer-
ence. However, such unobservable concerns should be taken care by state-fixed effects.
Among other factors, education and income have strong correlation with low female
to male child sex ratio. In fact, the difference in son-preference among the north-
ern and southern states have been explained by the education, income, and religion.
Bhalotra (2010) found wealthier families and more educated mothers were more likely
to sex-select against female children and further, conditional on these factors, Hindus
were more likely to sex-select compared to Muslims. Edlund (1999) discusses possible
reasons behind the hypothesized positive correlation between higher socioeconomic
status and favoritism for male children. The religious difference is more likely due
to explicit ban on abortion or infanticide among Muslims (Almond 09). To check
whether these policies were more likely to be taken up by wealthier families , more
educated families, or more Hindu families, I run a balance test using the covariates
used in equation (1). The results are reported in Table 16. Treated are those at birth
order one or two born in a state implementing a policy. In panel A, I use the full sam-
ple and compare the means of mother-specific or household specific characteristics.
The difference between treated and control groups appears to be significant, which
may indicate that even though we controlled for these covariates in our preferred
specification, treatments were correlated to some unobservable characteristics. How-
18Number of female children (per 1000 male children) in Haryana, Punjab, and Delhi in 2011 census were 834, 846,
and 871 respectively.
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ever, many of the observed difference such as age of mother and total children born
may arise because mothers who are in the control group were perhaps already beyond
the first two births at the time introduction of these policies, in which case they are
likely to be older than those who are in the treatment group and therefore,are likely
to have more children, and undergo more USG tests. To circumvent this problem, I
compare the characteristics for the first two births only. The results are reported in
Panel B of Table 16, where most of the differences have disappeared. However, the
difference between the groups persist for having electricity in the household and for
religion. This indicates the treated children belong to wealthier household and Hindu
families. If these characteristics were time invariant, then our estimates still hold as
our preferred specification controls for state fixed effects or if other controls together
have adequately captured variation in income or religion, then after controlling for
those covariates, indicators for having electricity and Hindus should not affect our
treatment. To confirm this, I take two strategies. First, I re-estimate equation (1)
excluding electricity and Hindu, respectively, and compare the estimates with our
main estimates in Table 5. For ease of comparison, I consolidate the results in Table
17. The results are virtually unchanged. In an alternative strategy, I regress the
indicator for having electricity and indicator for Hindu household head on an indi-
cator for those who were treated and all other covariates including the fixed effects.
The results are reported in Table 18. In column 1, I regress indicator for household
head being Hindu on treated and all the covariates except electricity included in main
regression, along with state fixed effects, time fixed effects, and a state-specific linear
trend. In column 2, I use indicator for having electricity as the outcome variable and
exclude Hindu from the regression. I do not find any association between treatment
and either of these outcome variables. This imply that after controlling for a subset
of variables, observable characteristics are not associated and therefore, it is unlikely
that any un-observable will be associated.
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1.9 Summary
There has been an ongoing effort to reduce the prevailing sex selection against girl
children in India in the form of cash incentives on the birth of a female child for more
than than a decade now. These cash transfer policies have multiple objectives such
as improving female survival, reducing fertility, and improving the age of marriage. I
identify such policies taken between until 2016 in different states in India and use three
rounds of NFHS and one round of DLHS data to see if they were effective in improving
the sex ratio more favorably towards female children. Previous studies focused on
evaluating a single policy in a single state. I focus on such policies in 17 states in
India and find evidence that the policies were effective in improving sex ratio at early
birth orders. More female children are reported at birth on order one and two. This
means that there was a redistribution of sex over birth orders. Pörtner (2015) found
that due to a falling trend in fertility, there was sex selection at early birth orders but
had not yet reached order one. I find specifically that at birth-order one and after the
policies come into effect, more female children are reported at birth. However, I also
find that death rates before age of one month and one year go up for female children
and go down for male children and death rate before five years of age go up only
for female children. This represents two puzzles. First, why more female children
are reported to be dead and second, why is there an effect on the male children,
given these policies are not targeted toward them. One possible explanation is that
future cash transfers motivates parents to keep their female children alive but do not
add to the current wealth of families. Under limited resources, families take more
care of male children compared to female children. While looking at immunization
of children against several diseases, I find evidence that female children are missing
out on vaccination against tuberculosis more than male children. It is also possible
that the focus of the states is moving away from healthcare service to the children
which, combined with the limited family resources and son-preference, continue to
affect female children more than male children. It appears that while implemented
36
with best intentions, these policies are failing to affect the age- old bias against female
children in the society.
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Figure 1.1: Availability of Policy over States
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Mothers in Sample
Had no child in
post policy period
(1)
Had at least one
child in
post-policy
period
(2)
Difference
(3)
Has a female child 0.7217 0.7131 0.0087∗∗∗
Has a male child 0.7609 0.7461 0.0148∗∗∗
Total children born 2.4128 2.2464 0.1664∗∗∗
Total girls 1.2012 1.1410 0.0601∗∗∗
Total boys 1.2116 1.1055 0.1061∗∗∗
Boys died 0.1002 0.0808 0.0194∗∗∗
Girls died 0.0863 0.0681 0.0182 ∗∗∗
Age of mother at birth 24.2020 24.3164 - 0.1143∗∗∗
Has electricity 0.6625 0.8002 -0.1378 ∗∗∗
Lives in an urban area 0.2475 0.2496 -0.0021
Has at least secondary education 0.7079 0.6148 0.0931 ∗∗∗
N 265,449 142,377 407,826
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics of Mothers in Sample
Had first child in
pre-policy period
(1)
Had first child in
post-policy
period
(2)
Difference
(3)
Has a female child 0.7492 0.5328 0.2164 ∗∗∗
Has a male child 0.7825 0.5925 0.1899 ∗∗∗
Total children born 2.5334 1.2667 1.2667 ∗∗∗
Total girls 1.2749 0.6325 0.6718 ∗∗∗
Total boys 1.2585 0.6636 0.5949 ∗∗∗
Boys died 0.1040 0.0293 0.0747 ∗∗∗
Girls died 0.0894 0.0226 0.0667 ∗∗∗
Age of mother at birth 24.5611 22.2787 2.2824 ∗∗∗
Has electricity 0.6911 0.8290 -0.1379 ∗∗∗
Lives in an urban area 0.2437 0.2761 -0.0324 ∗∗∗
Has at least secondary education 0.6663 0.7307 -0.0644 ∗∗∗
N 350,276 57,550 407,826
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 1.2: Ratio of Female Children Born at Different Birth Orders over All States
Figure 1.3: Ratio of Female Children Born at Different Birth Orders over All States
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Table 1.8: Effect of Policies on Female Death within 1 month
Outcome variable: Indicator for Death within 1 month
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth-order 1×Post× Female 0.0003∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001)
Birth-order 2×Post ×Female 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016)
Birth-order 1×Post -0.0055∗∗ -0.0063∗∗ -0.0069∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0028)
Birth-order 2×Post -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0021∗ -0.0025∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.0013)
Birth-order 1× Female -0.0024 ∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Birth-order 2 ×Female 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0016)
Post×Female 0.0025 0.0013 0.0024∗ 0.003∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Female -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Birth-order 1 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.004)
Birth-order 2 0.0005 0.0003 0.0034 0.004
(0.0009) (0.002) (0.0024) (0.003)
Post - 0.0031∗ -0.002 -0.0029∗∗ -0.001
(0.0016) (0.002) (0.0012) (0.001)
State & time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother & household char. No Yes Yes Yes
State specific linear trend No No Yes Yes
N states 25 25 25 17
Observations 526,622 526,622 526,622 452,565
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at state level are reported in brackets. Coulmn (1) includes state and time fixed effects,
Column (2) add mother and household characteristics that include current age of mother, religion of
the houshold head, indicator for mother having secondary education, indicator for having electricity,
having a toilet, having a car, an urban indicator, a proxy for having sonogram test during preganancy.
Column (3) inlcudes a state specific linear term. Column (4) restricts the data to 17 states which had
a policy. All specifications include year fixed effects and state fixed effects. Birth orders are restricted
to order 5, birth year is on or after 1996, data restricted to mothers between age 15 to 40 years old
with at least one birth.
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Table 1.9: Effect of Policies on Death within 1 year
Outcome variable: Indicator for Death within 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth-order 1×Post× Female 0.0025∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0033∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Birth-order 2×Post ×Female 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0017
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Birth-order 1×Post - 0.0013 -0.0016∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Birth-order 2×Post 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Birth-order 1× Female -0.0027∗∗ -0.0025∗∗ -0.0026∗∗ - 0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Birth-order 2 ×Female -0.0021∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0024∗
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Post×Female - 0.002∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0025∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Female 0.0022∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.0020∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Birth-order 1 0.0011∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.001)
Birth-order 2 - 0.0001 0.001 0.0016 0.0014
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0013)
Post - 0.0004 - 0.0001 - 0.0001 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
State & time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother & household char. No Yes Yes Yes
State specific linear trend No No Yes Yes
N states 25 25 25 17
Observations 520,319 520, 319 520, 319 446, 586
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at state level are reported in brackets. Coulmn (1) includes state and time fixed effects,
Column (2) add mother and household characteristics that include current age of mother, religion of
the houshold head, indicator for mother having secondary education, indicator for having electricity,
having a toilet, having a car, an urban indicator, a proxy for having sonogram test during preganancy.
Column (3) inlcudes a state specific linear term. Column (4) restricts the data to 17 states which had
a policy. All specifications include year fixed effects and state fixed effects. Birth orders are restricted
to order 5, birth year is on or after 1996, data restricted to mothers between age 15 to 40 years old
with at least one birth. Sample of children restricted to those who survived at least one month.
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Table 1.10: Effect of policies on death within 5 years
Outcome variable: Indicator for Death within 5 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth-order 1×Post× Female 0.0018∗ 0.0018∗ 0.0018∗ 0.0024∗∗
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Birth-order 2×Post ×Female 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Birth-order 1×Post 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.0005∗ 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Birth-order 2×Post 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Birth-order 1× Female -0.0018∗ -0.0016∗ -0.0016∗ -0.0020∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Birth-order 2 ×Female -0.0017∗∗ -0.0016∗∗ -0.0017∗∗ -0.0019∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0003)
Post×Female -0.0022 -0.0022∗∗ -0.0022∗∗ -0.0027∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Female 0.0022∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.0021∗∗ 0.0027∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Birth-order 1 -0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Birth-order 2 -0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Post - 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
State & time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother & household char. No Yes Yes Yes
State specific linear trend No No Yes Yes
N states 25 25 25 17
Observations 517,501 517,501 517,501 444, 013
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at state level are reported in brackets. Coulmn (1) includes state and time fixed effects,
Column (2) add mother and household characteristics that include current age of mother, religion of
the houshold head, indicator for mother having secondary education, indicator for having electricity,
having a toilet, having a car, an urban indicator, a proxy for having sonogram test during preganancy.
Column (3) inlcudes a state specific linear term. Column (4) restricts the data to 17 states which had
a policy. All specifications include year fixed effects and state fixed effects. Birth orders are restricted
to order 5, birth year is on or after 1996, data restricted to mothers between age 15 to 40 years old
with at least one birth. Sample of children restricted to those who survived at least one year.
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Table 1.13: Effect of Policies on Female Birth - Including state-year fixed effect
Outcome variable: Indicator for Female Birth
All States Policy-States
Birth-order 1×Post 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0030)
Birth-order 2×Post 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0038)
Birth-order 1 0.0039 0.0073∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0029)
Birth-order 2 0.0034 0.0057∗
(0.0024) (0.0028)
Post - 0.0312 ∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0023)
Total Effect of the Policies - 0.0207 ∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002)
State & time fixed effects Y Y
Mother & household char. Y Y
State specific time fixed effects Y Y
N states 25 17
Observations 532,144 455, 446
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors clustered at state level are reported in brackets. Mother and household char-
acteristics include current age of mother, religion of the houshold head, indicator for mother
having secondary education, indicator for having electricity, having a toilet, having a car, an
urban indicator, a proxy for having sonogram test during preganancy. All specifications include
year fixed effects and state fixed effects. Birth orders are restricted to order 5, birth year is on
or after 1996, data restricted to mothers between age 15 to 40 years old with at least one birth.
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Table 1.16: Balance Test
Panel A: All births Panel B: Upto first two births
Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
Age of mother 25.03 26.75 - 1.72∗∗∗ 25.03 24.60 0.43
(0.21) (0.19) (0.24) (0.21) (0.33) (0.40)
Age of mother at birth 23.14 24.93 - 1.78∗∗∗ 23.14 22.80 0.34
(0.18) (0.20) (0.25) (0.18) (0.29) (0.29)
Has Secondary education 0.68 0.67 0.01 0.68 0.76 - 0.08
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) 0.05 (0.02) (0.05)
HH has no toilet facility 0.45 0.53 - 0.08∗ 0.45 0.45 -0.006
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
HH has electricity 0.82 0.66 0.17∗∗∗ 0.82 0.71 0.11∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
HH owns a car 0.05 0.03 0.02∗ 0.05 0.05 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.63)
HH head is Hindu 0.83 0.71 0.12∗∗ 0.83 0.71 0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
HH head is Christian 0.02 0.08 - 0.06 0.02 0.08 - 0.06∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
HH head is Muslim 0.11 0.17 - 0.06∗∗ 0.11 0.15 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
HH head is a female 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
HH is in urban area 0.26 0.22 0.04 0.26 0.26 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Total children born 1.78 2.95 - 1.16∗∗∗ 1.78 1.85 - 0.06
(0.05) (0.13) (0.1) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Had USG test 0.65 0.33 0.31∗∗∗ 0.65 0.41 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observation 122,072 404,550 526,622 122,072 221,236 343,308
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at state level are reported in brackets.
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Table 1.17: Effect of Policies on Female birth -Testing for Dependence on Hindu Religion and
Electricity
Outcome variable: Indicator for Female Birth
(3) (4) (5)
Birth-order 1×Post 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Birth-order 2×Post 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Birth-order 1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Birth-order 2 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Post -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ - 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Control for Having Electricity Yes Yes No
Control for Hindu Household Head Yes No Yes
N states 25 25 25
Observations 526,622 526,622 526,622
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors clustered at state level are reported in brackets. Mother and household char-
acteristics include current age of mother, Household head being Muslim, Household head being
christian, indicator for mother having secondary education, having a toilet, having a car, an
urban indicator, total number of children, a proxy for having sonogram test during pregnancy.
All specifications include year fixed effects and state fixed effects. Birth orders are restricted to
order 8, birth year is on or after 1996, data restricted to mothers between age 15 to 40 years old
with at least one birth.
Table 1.18: Effect of Policies on Female birth - Alternative Testing for Dependence on Hindu Religion
and Electricity
Household Head is
Hindu
Household Has
Electricity
Treated - 0.0016 0.0030
(0.0015) (0.0113)
N states 25 25
Observations 526,622 526,622
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors clustered at state level are reported in brackets. Mother and household char-
acteristics include current age of mother, Household head being Muslim, Household head being
christian, indicator for mother having secondary education, having a toilet, having a car, an ur-
ban indicator, total number of children, household head being a female, age of mother at birth,
a proxy for having sonogram test during pregnancy. All specifications include year fixed effects,
state fixed effects, and state-specific linear trend. Birth orders are restricted to order 8, birth
year is on or after 1996, data restricted to mothers between age 15 to 40 years old with at least
one birth.
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Chapter 2
Reducing The Rural-Urban Educational Gap in India
through Rural School Investment
2.1 Introduction
Human capital outcomes may vary widely within a country because of existing re-
gional difference in economic development. Rural areas, for example, in almost all low
and middle income countries, face shortages in the supply of basic necessities of life
such as food, healthcare, education, and sometimes, even lack habitable environment.
Under these circumstances, public policies that apply across regions are likely to be
more effective in urban areas compared to rural areas.
One fundamental policy focus of less developed countries for the past two decades is
to empower their female citizens. Several policies exist at the state or country level to
benefit its women and the female children that have been found to improve female-to-
male sex ratio (Kalsi, 2017), reduce child marriage (Castilla, 2018), increase maternal
healthcare utilization (Sado et al., 2014), improve educational outcomes (Kalsi, 2015),
and improve overall economic development (Duflo, 2012). The underlying strategies
of these policies range from providing cash transfers, legalizing abortion to providing
basic means of transportation to pursue higher education1, which are expected to
create economic demand for human capital.
1An example of female empowerment in politics is the reservation of seats for women in India. The 73rd and 74th
Amendments established villages and urban units as the smallest unit of governance. One-third of the total number
of seats from each unit was reserved for women. Duflo (2012) is an excellent source for understanding how the gender
gap has reduced following economic development and how economic development in turn, has affected various aspect
of the gender gap.
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However, supply-side disparity between urban and rural areas is likely to cause
rural areas to fall short of urban areas in terms of policy achievements. To reduce
these regional economic differences, measures have been pursued by developing coun-
tries using tax revenues and development aid from multiple sources such as the World
Bank, United Nations, and philanthropic efforts from foreign organizations. More-
over, targets set by the Millennium Development Goals to achieve its key objectives
within a given period of time have made it more important than before to address
these fundamental issues. Whether these efforts can successfully translate to broader
economic success, remains to be seen.
In particular, this paper examines whether rural-urban difference in education
among female children falls following an investment in rural school infrastructure,
which heavily falls short of their urban counterpart. A basic necessity for every
school is to have a proper sanitation system. While all children are equally disad-
vantaged when it comes to using a restroom where there is none, female children are
more vulnerable to a lack of a restroom compared to their male peers because they
need more privacy as they reach adolescence and go through menstruation cycles. In
general, they may feel unsafe if they are forced to use open areas when they need to
relieve themselves and as a result, they may discontinue attending schools. Moreover,
such practices are also associated with spread of infectious diseases (Fentiman et al.,
1999; Burgers, 2000; Kirk and Sommer, 2006) and clean sanitation practices are con-
sidered to be a first preventive measure to prevent human contamination. Female
children born in the urban areas do not face such basic lack of infrastructure and
therefore, are advantaged compared to rural children. Given this scenario, a policy
that incentivizes children to attend schools may only achieve limited success in the
rural areas.
Historically, female literacy rates have been low in India, particularly in rural areas.
The 2001 census revealed that female literacy rates in rural and urban areas were
46.7 percent and 73.2 percent, respectively (Ministry of Statistics and Programme
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Implementation, India 2016)2 . Using district level school characteristics from 175
districts3 in India, surveyed during 2001-02 academic year, I find that on average,
only 16.5% of the primary schools had a separate female restroom on average. Lack
of proper sanitation is widely linked to spreading of diseases such as diarrhea (Pruss-
Ustun, Annette and World Health Organization and others, 2008), which is among
the top causes of infant mortality in India (Lakshminarayanan and Jayalakshmy,
2015).
Moreover, having separate restrooms for adolescent females is important because
they need more privacy as they go through menstruation, a biological function experi-
enced by them every month. A survey done by Adukia for her seminal paper (Adukia,
2017), revealed that female children drop out as the timing of exams and menstrual
cycles coincide, which cannot be retaken later.4 She established that female enroll-
ment increased following restroom establishment. Factors other than menstruation
are also important for female school attendance. Ray and Datta, 2017 finds that pro-
vision of female restrooms through SSHE reduced gender-parity index of enrollment
for schedule-caste children5 although gender-parity improved for all children, which
may indicate caste-related discrimination in the society. Similar provisions in schools
in Kenya are associated with increased attendance rates at the primary level ( Kim,
Hyoungjong and Rhee, Dong-Eun, 2019) and the effects are larger for pubescent-age
female children than boys.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper looking at regional gap in
school completion rates. These gaps have remained wide for decades for a number of
reasons that include supplying labor to household work, considering education to be
unnecessary, withdrawing children out of school for marriage, not having proper fa-
2The earlier figures for female rural (urban) literacy rates in the censuses were 4.87% (22.33%) in 1951, 10.1%
(40.5%) in 1961, 15.5% (48.8%) in 1971, 21.3% (56.3) in 1981, and 30.17% (64.05%) in 1991.
3Out of approximately 500 districts, approximately 175 districts were surveyed, Source: District Information
System of Education, India.
4Globally, there is a stigma around menstruation (Litman, 2018) and India, given its cultural attitudes towards
women, lacks no behind others (Garg and Anand, 2015). In Adukia’s survey, the principles of a number of schools
opined that not having a separate restroom or not having a restroom at all is not a problem for the students as they
follow “regimented” hygiene practice.
5Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes refer to communities of people of depressed classes who were considered as
’low-caste’ groups historically.
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cilities at the school, and lack of transportation/ roads connecting to schools (NFHS2
, Young Lives Survey). Adukia, 2017 showed that enrollment rates have increased,
more students appeared for exams, and passed exams.
This paper examines rural-urban educational gap for female children following
rural female restroom provision in schools. The underlying assumption is that children
in urban area do not move to a rural area following the provision of female restrooms
in schools and vice versa. The assumption is likely to be valid as it is unlikely that
parents who are able to afford living in urban areas will send their daughters to school
in a rural area because of better restrooms. Moreover, rural children, especially village
children, take up schooling within their village (Adukia, 2017).
In this paper, I use data from Demographic (National Family and Household Sur-
vey in India) Health Survey and District Level Household survey for individual ed-
ucational achievement and match the available proportion of schools with female
restroom data in their district of residence from the District Information System for
Education in India. I compare the average educational achievement of a female child
in rural areas within a district, at each age, and academic year to the average educa-
tional achievement of a female child in an urban area within that district, age, and
academic year. The variation in the proportion of schools with a female restroom
reflects the “before” and “after” period of availability of female restrooms. The un-
derlying assumption is that, in absence of the policy, rural areas would have followed
the same trend in educational achievement as prior to having schools with restroom
provision.
I find that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of schools with female
restrooms increases the probability of secondary school completion of rural female
children by 6 percentage points. The corresponding increase in the years of education
of among female children attending secondary schools in rural area is 0.63 years. For
upper primary education (standard 6-8), there is 13 percentage points more com-
pletion and 0.58 more years of education. Higher secondary (standard 11-12) school
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children do not experience any significant increase in the completion rate and the ben-
efit is limited to female children who have completed secondary education. Primary
school attendees also gain significantly from the provision of restrooms.
Assuming there has been similar a increase in the proportion of restrooms for
male children, as the policy targeted building restrooms separately for both sexes, I
find school completion rates at every level, except higher secondary schooling, have
increased for rural male children as well. In contrast to female children, positive effects
are absent for male children who have completed secondary schooling, implying that
female children gain marginally more due to restroom building in schools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes policy background,
section 3 describes the data, section 4 describes the econometric model used, section
5 discuss the results, and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Policy Background6
Building female restrooms in households and schools, particularly in the rural areas,
was a part of the Government of India’s policy goals from the 1980s. In an effort
to achieve the goals, the Central Rural Sanitation Program (CRSP) was initiated in
1986 to provide sanitation facilities (Kumar et al., 2010). Despite subsidies, there
was a shortage of the funds to push the program and therefore, rural sanitation
systems remained underdeveloped for the next decade (Pruss-Ustun, Annette and
World Health Organization and others, 2008). Only 22 percent rural households were
found to have access to restrooms in 2001. The CRSP was restructured and renamed
as the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) in 1999 and was implemented across 606
districts of 30 states in India (Kumar et al., 2010).
Alongside the program, the UN announced Millennium Development Goals in
early 2000 which were aimed at reducing infant mortality in developing countries by
2015. However, reaching such goals alone by building school toilets was not possible,
6This section is based heavily on policy information obtained from Department of Drinking Water Ministry (2005)
and Adukia (2017).
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given the practice of open defecation, particularly in rural areas of India with high
prevalence of soil and water-borne diseases. Given the large school going population
in India and its open defecation culture in the rural areas, it required a parallel
program that would educate the population about the importance of safe sanitation
practices. To fulfill that objective, the School Sanitation and Hygiene Education
(SSHE) program was also implemented as a part of the TSC that sought to eliminate
open defecation, educate people about the importance of hygiene, and promote safer
environment for female children in schools by building female restrooms (Snel et al.,
2002; Adukia, 2017). The program involved the local community to promote words
on safe hygiene practices and monetary awards were announced for areas that reached
complete sanitation coverage and elimination of open defecation. These awards were
important for local leaders who boasted their achievements to neighboring villages.
The SSHE program was implemented by the National Government through State
Governments which involved the democratically elected local government at the vil-
lage level, known as the gram-panchayat. Each state government in India is decen-
tralized at multiple levels. A state is divided into a few divisions and each division
consists of a number of districts (or Zilla). Districts are further divided into subdivi-
sions (also known as Tehsils ) which are divided into blocks and wards. Blocks refer
to the rural parts of the subdivision and wards refer to the urban areas. A block
consists of several villages whereas wards consist of city councils.
At the school level, the Parent Teacher Association, School Management Commit-
tee and at the village level, gram-panchayat were responsible for the implementation
of the SSHE. The funds for building restrooms came from both the national gov-
ernment and state government, although national government’s share were almost
double that of state government’s share for each academic year. During the initial
years of the projects, between 1999-2002, available funds were low, but picked up
substantially during school year 2002-03 (Department of Drinking Water Ministry,
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2005)7. To ensure the functioning of the newly built restrooms, the government also
allocated funds for water facilities. Each state was asked to prepare an action plan
for SSHE that included the number schools that needed water sources, restrooms,
repair, and maintenance. To develop coordination between the various involved de-
partments such as education, health, and public health engineering, and women and
child development, a representative body (State Water and Sanitation Mission) was
formed (Department of Drinking Water Ministry, 2005).
Redistribution of funds from the district level to the local government did not fol-
low any systematic pattern and each district differed in their respective strategy for
allocation. Funds for school restrooms and water facilities (under the SSHE) remained
separate from funds for restroom facilities for households in the TSC (Adukia, 2017).
However, local political connections with states may have played a role in the alloca-
tion of resources, specifically if offices were held by female politicians (Lee, 2018) who
may stress on developments that benefit female children. In this paper, I cover the
full roll-out period of distribution of the policies, taking into consideration proportion
of female leaders from each state who were holding offices at the center during that
period. The next section describes the several sources of data that I use to study
impact of the policy.
2.3 Data
The data for this paper comes from three sources. For records on educational achieve-
ments of children, I use rounds II and III of District Level Household Survey (DLHS)
and National Family Health Survey (NFHS) Round 2 and Round 4. DLHS and NFHS
are cross-sectional household level surveys conducted by the International Institute
for Population Sciences (IIPS) and are targeted towards tracking reproductive and
child health in India, and collect detailed information of currently married women
aged 15-44 and unmarried women aged 15-24. Round II of DLHS survey was com-
7Adukia (2017) reports that financial allocation increased substantially from 2003-04 academic year.
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pleted during the year 2002-04 in 593 districts and round III was conducted during
the year 2007-2009. NFHS round 2 and round 4 were carried our between 1998-00
and 2015-16.
For each household, NFHS collects demographic information including age, sex,
and years of schooling of each member along with characteristics of the household such
as source of drinking water, type of house, type of toilet, source of light, availability
of electricity, and whether the household is located in an urban or a rural area. Other
rounds of NFHS data do not identify the district in which the household is located
and DLHS-III only surveys certain states of India due to its complementarity with
another survey in the same year. From the date of interview, I identify the academic
year in which the household was surveyed. Years of schooling implies how many
standards the person completed, for example, 9 years of education means he passed
standard 9. There is no information on the year in which the person attended his last
year of education and the combined data does not indicate if the person is currently in
school as such information is missing on the DLHS-II. I drop children whose number
of years of education is more than his/her age.
The source of school data is District Information System for Education, which
provides district level aggregate data on schools in India annually. The earliest year
of data available is 2001-028. For earlier years in the full sample between 2001-16, the
survey only collected data from a small number of districts, however, over the years, it
expanded to cover every district in India. For each district, it reports the total number
of schools available in each of five discrete categories, primary only (standard 1-5);
primary with upper primary (standard 1-8); primary, upper primary, with secondary
and higher secondary (standard 1-12); upper primary only (standard 6-8); and upper
primary with secondary and higher secondary (standard 8-12). It also reports district
level information for the number of schools with no female teacher, number of public
and private schools, and number of schools with female restrooms for each of the
8Although 2000-01 is available, the information are different from later years.
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five categories above. Using the five categories of schools, I calculate the percentage
of schools with female restrooms providing l-th level of education, where l can be
primary, upper-primary, secondary or higher secondary. In the appendix, for each
level, I describe how the percentage is calculated.
Until 2013-14, the survey reported the number of schools with unisex restrooms
and female restrooms, but afterwards, they report the number of schools with female
restrooms and male restrooms separately. Since neither complete information on the
number of schools with unisex restrooms or male restrooms are available, I restrict
my main analysis to only female children.
Also, parents may prefer sending a female child to a school which has a female
teacher and therefore, it is important to control for the proportion of schools with
female teachers. Omitting proportion of schools with female teachers may cause
omitted variable bias as female teachers may be more willing to accept a job at a
school which has a female restroom. Data on the proportion of schools without a
female teacher is available for years until 2013-14. I assume that during the academic
years 2014-15 and 2015-16, percentage of schools with no female teachers remain the
same.
I match school data using the child’s district of residence and I restrict the sample
to female children who are not married, because the surveys do not identify where
women lived prior to marriage. In India, the patriarchal system dictates that women
leave their parents’ house to stay with her in-laws/husband and none of the surveys
available during that period reported residence before marriage. I further assume that
a child attended school in the district where the household resides. Moreover, since
the earliest year of usable school data available is from the 2001-2002 academic year,
I assign the children in NFHS round 2 the district level school information available
in the 2001-02 academic year. This assumption is likely to be valid as there was very
little effort in improving school infrastructure before 2003-04, when financial support
from the government of India increased substantially.
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The main challenge in constructing the combined data is that between 1998 and
2015, new Indian states were formed from existing states and numerous districts
were divided into smaller districts, revising district identifiers in each survey. To
have a common identifier for each state and each district for the combined data, I
manually assigned each state and district the codes used in NFHS-2. Newer districts
were identified and were assigned its parent district code. The restricted sample
of unmarried female children between age 6 and 18 contains 1,150,951 observations.
However, due to missing values in the school data, some observations are dropped
from the analysis. I restrict the analysis to children between age 6 and 18 as they are
considered the typical age at which a child enters standard 1 and completes standard
12, respectively.
Table 2.1 reports changes in the rural and urban characteristics over time, assuming
SSHE took off in 2003. Both urban and rural areas have experienced significant
changes in local household characteristics. In Table 2.2, I look at how the rural-urban
educational gap changed in the post-2003 years from pre-2003 years and report the raw
difference-in-differences figures for each level of school completion. I observe that both
regions experienced an increase in completion rates, however, rural areas experienced
larger increases, indicating that rural-urban educational gap has declined. It also
shows the change in the available proportion of schools with female restrooms for
respective levels of education. It also appears that there has been a 23-40 percentage
point increase in the proportion of schools with female restrooms. It appears that
for each percentage point increase in proportion of schools with female restrooms,
the difference in high school completion rate between rural-urban area is reduced
by 9 percentage points. Corresponding numbers for secondary, upper-primary, and
primary completion rates are 13 percentage points, 23 percentage points, and 15
percentage points, respectively. It remains to see if these changes are significant after
controlling for changes in regional characteristics, for which, I turn to an empirical
framework described in the next section.
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2.4 Model
The empirical specification for estimating the effect of new toilets on schooling is
given by
Yidt = α+ β1Tdt + β2I(Rurali) + β3Tdt × I(Rurali) + γXitd + µt + φd + εitd............(1),
where Yidt denotes educational achievement of the i − th child in district d in
academic year t. In some analyses, Yidt is an indicator if child i has completed pri-
mary education, upper-primary education, secondary education, or higher-secondary
education and in some analyses, it is the number of years of education of child i
completed. Tdt is the percentage of schools with female restrooms at different levels
of education. I(Rurali) is an indicator for child i living in a rural area. The pri-
mary interest is coefficient β3, the interaction of percentage of schools with female
restrooms with the rural indicator. β3 is identified under two assumptions. First, ru-
ral and urban children followed similar trends in educational achievement and second,
in the absence of SSHE or TSC, the trend in rural percentage of schools with female
restroom follow the same trend as that before the policy introduction. I estimateβ3
for each level of schooling, separately, restricting the sample to appropriate age group
for each set of analyses. Typically, a child enters standard 1 at age 6 and completes
primary education at age 11 when she is promoted to standard 6 and thereby enters
upper-primary education. Students are on average 14 years old when they complete
upper primary education by passing standard 8 and start secondary schooling. If a
student continues her studies without a break, she completes secondary education
(standard 10) at 16 and higher secondary education (standard 12) at 18 years of age,
respectively. Robust standard errors for the coefficients are calculated clustering the
data at the district level.
Xidt is a set of control variables that includes total number of schools, percentage
of school without female teachers, female literacy rate calculated using the primary
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school completion rate of women aged 15 or above, an indicator for household head
being a female, household head’s religion, sex of the child, dummies for age of children,
number of women in the household, and an indicator for having electricity. µt are
academic year fixed effect and φd are district fixed effects. Finally, εitd denotes an
error term capturing other factors that may affect i′s schooling.
Among the covariates, the percentage of schools without a female teacher is impor-
tant as parents may not want to send their female child to a school where no female
teachers are available, for possibly security concerns. Moreover, the presence of female
teachers makes it likely that the school will have separate female restrooms (Kremer
et al., 2005). Female literacy rate proxies for the time varying cultural attitude to-
wards females that is not captured by the district fixed effects. Having electricity is
a proxy for development in a region (Henderson et al., 2012) , as I do not observe the
wealth of a family, I use having electricity as a proxy.
In separate regressions for urban and rural children on the percentage of schools
with female restrooms controlling for age, district, and academic year fixed effects
will allow me to interpret the estimated coefficient as the increase in the probability
of school completion within every age, in a year, and within a district where the
variation in the percentage of schools with female restrooms comes from SSHE ini-
tiative. Interacting percentage of schools with restrooms with a rural dummy and
controlling for rural areas fixed effects merely combines two separate regressions for
rural and urban areas and reflects β3 in specification 1, which shows the difference in
the changes in probability of school completion due to one percentage point increase
in schools with restrooms between the rural and the urban areas.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Female Educational Outcomes
Table 2.3 shows the higher secondary education outcome for female children. In
panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for the i-th child completing higher
secondary education or alternatively passing standard 12 while in panel B, it is the
years of education for female children of age 16-18. Higher secondary examination
is one of the two state-level/ country-level examinations that a child has to take to
complete school education. It is taken at the end of standard 12. The first and the
other secondary examination is held at the end of standard 10. The certificates and
scores obtained from these exams are often used later in life to qualify for taking
college/university entrance examinations or to apply for jobs. Therefore, these two
examinations are considered the most important examinations in school. Schools
often target preparing the students for these examinations as the reputation of schools
depend on the outcomes of these examinations. For female children in rural areas,
this may not be an overly important factor, especially given the attitude towards
these children, but they may matter on the margin for parents who want to provide
quality education for their children.
The main parameter of interest is β3 in equation 1, the interaction between the
percentage of higher secondary schools with female restrooms and an indicator for i-th
child residing in a rural area. Ideally, a child finishes school at age 18 and therefore,
I restrict the sample to 18 year old unmarried female children. Consequently, the age
dummy is dropped from the set of control variable in equation 1. Column 1 shows
the estimates without any fixed effects or additional regressors. The estimate shows
that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of higher secondary schools
with female restrooms increases higher secondary completion rate for rural female
children by 7 percentage points.The results in column (1) are robust to adding years
and district level fixed effects (column (2)).
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When regressors to control for household and local area characteristics are added
to the specification (column (3)), it appears that the interaction between percent of
higher secondary schools with female restrooms and rural residence of child i is cor-
related to the area and household characteristics and omitting them causes a positive
bias in estimating β3. Well off families may invest more in the education of their chil-
dren and relatively wealthier rural areas may have more improved higher secondary
schools than poorer areas. Controlling for the local characteristics approximates stan-
dard of living of the families in that area and therefore, it reduces the magnitude and
takes away the significance of β3.
Higher secondary education demands significantly more efforts than an internal
mid-term examination. Given this requirement, education cost is often higher as
students pay tuition and buy more books. Education is free up to upper primary
level in public schools, beyond which, parents need to pay school tuition. As a result,
there is a significant difference in the proportion of children continuing education after
they complete upper-primary education, particularly in the rural areas.
In column (4), I restrict the sample further to those 18-year old children who
have completed secondary education. I find a 5 percentage points increase in higher
secondary completion rate for rural female children. The restricted sample differs
significantly in terms of wealth-related household characteristics, 89.6 percent of the
children have electricity in their household compared to 81 percent in the full sample.
68 percent of children have toilets in their household compared to 57 percent of chil-
dren in the sample used in column (3). Finally, 72 percent children have a television
in their household compared to 58 percent children in the full sample. Together,
these differences may indicate that the sample of 18 year old children who completed
secondary education differ from the rest of the sample in terms of family income.
Only these parents could harness the benefit of having female restrooms in schools by
sending their female children to schools, resulting in a marginally significant increase
in completion rates.
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In panel B, the sample is restricted to 16-18 years old children who would typically
attend higher secondary education. I estimate equation (1) without any covariates or
fixed effects in column (5) and find 1.06 years increase in the years of schooling for
female children between 16 and 18. Adding district and year fixed effects in column (6)
increase the coefficient to 1.27 years. In column (7), I add the remaining covariates
and estimate the fully specified equation (1). The estimate indicates that a one
percentage point increase in the proportion of higher secondary schools with female
restroom is associated with 0.48 more years of education. However, not everyone
in the sample will actually attend standard 11-12 because some children will fall
behind due to grade repeat, missed years of schooling, and dropping out of school
earlier. Moreover, schools with higher secondary education may have other levels of
education (such as secondary education) and since a restroom use is not grade specific,
the estimate likely reflects an increase in years of schooling that includes years gained
in secondary education or in other levels of education- I explore this possibility later
in the analysis for secondary, upper-primary, and primary education.
To see if years of education has increased among rural female children who have
completed secondary education, I exclude children with years of education less than
10 in column (8) (similar to column (4)). These children do not obtain any significant
increase in the years of education as a result of more female restrooms. Again, these
restricted sample has children who belong to a wealthier family, therefore, they were
likely to afford education nevertheless and hence, no significant increase in the number
of years of education.
Taking column (3) and (7) together in Table 2.3, students between 16-18 years
are getting more years of education than before the SSHE initiative but are not
completing higher secondary education at higher rates than before the initiative.
On the other hand, in column (4) and (8), students who have completed secondary
education and are likely from better-off families, have not gained any significant years
of education from restroom building but are completing higher secondary education
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than before. It is not immediately clear why there is no increase in years of education
yet a significant increase in completion rate. One possible explanation is that these
children were attending schools further from their residence before the SSHE initiative
and such long commutes left them little time and energy to focus on their studies
completely. After restrooms were built in nearby schools, they chose to enroll in a
nearby school and gained time to study for final exams. Unfortunately, I cannot
evaluate this hypothesis because I do not observe the distance of the school they
attended.
Column (3), column (7), and column (8) together imply that students who dropped
out, repeated grades or enrolled late in school are continuing their education. As seen
from years gained in column (7), for full sample who do not complete higher secondary
education rates than before the initiative (column (3)). The increase in the number
of years of education are absent for female children who are in grade for their age
(column (8)), thus the gain is likely to be coming from those who were left behind.
I follow similar exercises for secondary education. The results are shown in Table
2.4. In the interest of space, I focus the discussion of results on the preferred speci-
fication with household and local characteristics shown in columns (3), (4), (7), and
(8). Between 14-16 years, children are likely to attend secondary education and at 16
years, a child is likely to have completed secondary education. For rate of completion
in panel A in Table 2.4, therefore, I look at children within 16-18 years of age. I
observe one percentage point increase in schools with female restroom is associated
with 6 percentage points increase in secondary school completion for rural female
children. For children who have completed upper primary education, the increase is
4 percentage points. The corresponding increase in the years of education are 0.63
and 0.02 years (column (7) and column (8)), respectively. Unlike higher secondary
education, there is an increase in secondary completion rate in Column (3), perhaps
because students who dropped out earlier were coming back to complete secondary
education and obtain their first state level educational certificate, which is considered
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the minimum requirement in applying for jobs or for further education.
Next, I examine the effect of an increase in female restrooms on upper primary
and primary education. The results for completion rates and years of education
are shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. The main difference in the analyses of these two
levels of education is that, unlike secondary and higher secondary education, primary
and upper primary education is free in public schools. In case of upper primary
schooling, a one percentage point increase in female restrooms is associated with a 13
percentage points increase in completion rates and 0.58 years increase in the years of
upper-primary education among rural female children. The corresponding increases
for primary schooling are 9 percentage points and 0.25 years, respectively. Upper
primary female students are most likely to experience monthly menstruation for the
first time so it is not unreasonable to observe the largest effect for these children, as
they can obtain free education while having a safe and separate sanitation system in
school.
Children who dropped out, repeated grades or had enrolled in grades later for
their age are continuing their education and completing secondary, upper-primary,
and primary education at higher rates after SSHE initiative, as seen from columns
(3) and (7) of Tables (4) - (6). The coefficient in column (3) is at least as large
as that in column (4) and the coefficient in column (7) is at least as large as that
in column (8). Columns (4) and (8) restrict the sample to those who are in grade
for their age. The presence of increase in the years of education and the absence
of completion of higher secondary education of children 16-18 years old in Table (3)
reinforce the result that those who fell behind are more likely to complete the lower
grades of education following the increase in the percentage of schools with female
restrooms. These results suggest that the SSHE policy initiative was successful in
improving educational outcomes among female children.
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2.5.2 Additional Results
In this section, I further explore the effect of the SSHE initiative on sub-populations
of interest other than female children. I examine any possible benefits for two such
samples: male children 18 years or younger and children residing in low-income states
in India. Studying the effect of restrooms on male children allows us to understand
whether the benefits of building separate restrooms were limited to female children
only and if not, it lets us compare the magnitude of the effects for the two sexes.
Section 5.2.1 focuses on the effects of male children. On the other hand, the subset of
low-income states in India is of special interest as they are expected to have the least
proportion of schools with female restrooms. Economic theory predicts that marginal
benefits are larger when inputs are low, so we can expect provision of restrooms in
schools in the poorest areas will have larger benefits. Section 5.2.2 examines this
possibility.
2.5.2.1 Effect on Male Children
I estimate the model of educational outcomes for male children while continuing to
focus on the interaction between proportion of schools with female restrooms and rural
residence. The data do not report percent of schools with boys restrooms for majority
of the years. However, it can be assumed that if a school has a separate restroom for
females, it also has a separate restroom for males. Also, the SSHE program had the
objective of building separate school restrooms for both sexes, therefore, it can be
assumed the proportion of schools with male restrooms and female restrooms grew
at the same rate.
Increases in the percentage of schools with male restrooms did not have significant
effect on high school completion rates (Table 2.7), even when the sample is restricted
to those who have completed secondary education. In contrast, female children who
completed secondary education gained from restroom building in schools. The lack of
significant effects on educational outcomes for male children suggests the importance
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of a separate restrooms for female children.
For male children, however, there are significant increases in secondary (Table
2.8), upper-primary (Table 2.9), and primary completion rates (Table 2.10) associated
with increases in schools with restrooms. The effects are almost always stronger for
female children except for secondary schooling. A possible reason could be that,
culturally, male children are assumed to earn for their families and therefore, having
a certificate on a state/nationally recognized exam is important as passing secondary
education is the minimum educational qualification for many public sector jobs that
pay secured income with additional benefits until the age of retirement and pension
afterwards. Consequently, there is a 7 percentage point increase in the secondary
school completion rates associated with one percentage point increase in schools with
restrooms (Table 2.8 column (3) ).
2.5.2.2 Effect in Low Income States
India’s economic growth in the first decade of the millennium was around 6 percent.
However, the positive effects of the growth were not spread equally among all the
states and some low-income states remained the poorest in the country (The World
Bank, 2018). These states were Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh,
Odisha, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. In the analysis that follows, I divide the
sample into two groups of states- one for these states which I refer to as ’backward
states’ and the rest into another group that I refer to as ’forward states’.
Table 2.11 presents the estimates from model 1 for the two groups. Panel A and
B show the results for female children belonging to backward and forward states,
respectively. For brevity, I report only the results for estimating a fully specified
model (corresponding columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) in Tables 3-10). Each panel
reports the results for completing higher secondary, secondary, upper primary, and
primary education. For each level of education, I also restrict the sample to those
children who are at age for their grade, and estimate the same model, as to understand
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to what extent the overall estimates are influenced by children who did not fall behind
in terms of completing the grades.
The effect of increased school restroom provision is almost always stronger for the
backward states in Panel A compared to the forward states in Panel B. The benefit
of having restrooms in schools gradually fades as we move up the levels of education
from primary to higher secondary, in both backward and forward states. Female
children in backward states benefits significantly from restroom provision in school
as 7 percentage points more children are completing secondary education due to one
percentage points more schools with restrooms. Similar benefits are absent for female
children in forward states. This highlights the importance of supply side factors, such
as restroom provision in human capital development. Poorer areas are not able to
improve their standard of living because necessary supplies are not available, although
there could be demand for them. Paxson and Schady (2002) finds similar results from
Peru’s school investment in the poorest areas.
As before, any positive effect at any level of education is considerably driven by
those who completed all previous levels of education. For example, in backward states,
at the secondary level, there is a 7 percentage points increase in the completion rates,
and more than fifty-percent of this effect follows from those who completed the upper
primary levels. Also, the largest benefits of these programs are observed for the upper-
primary school children, most of whom are entering adolescence, in both backward
and forward states. The trend of the effects are similar for years of education, as
reported in Table 2.12. For males, a strong effect exist at the secondary level apart
from the upper primary level (Table 2.13 and Table 2.14), possibly because of the
stated importance of passing the secondary level exam.
2.6 Conclusion
Historically, India’s rural-urban education gap has been consistently large in terms
of education, specifically for female children. Rural areas fall behind urban areas as
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they lack proper infrastructure to provide life’s basic necessities such as education
and healthcare. I study the effect of constructing female restroom in schools in the
districts of India through a national school sanitation system initiative focused on
the rural areas. Using an individual data from multiple sources and aggregate school
data at the district level, I examine whether female restroom provision in schools
improved the educational outcomes of the rural children.
To summarize, I examine the effects of having female restrooms in schools on school
completion rates of female children, using variation introduced by the School Sani-
tation and Hygiene Education program as a part of the Total Sanitation Campaign
in India. I find that for one percentage point increase in rural school restroom pro-
vision, female education completion rates for secondary, upper-primary, and primary
education have gone up, implying a reduction in the rural-urban educational gap for
female children following the SSHE initiative to build restrooms in schools. However,
similar benefits for high school completion are only observed for female children who
completed secondary education - an effect which is absent for male children complet-
ing secondary education, implying restroom provision is more beneficial for female
children. The effects are largest for female children entering adolescence. Further-
more, female children in low income states in India benefit more from having female
restrooms than the middle and high-income states.
Under reasonable assumptions, I find that separate restrooms can benefit male
children also. However, except for secondary school completion, estimates are larger
for female children. Completion of secondary schooling is often a precondition for
many public sector jobs and since men are culturally assumed to be the breadwin-
ner for the family, male children opt for more secondary education, following school
restroom building.
The estimates are consistent with Adukia, 2017, who estimates the effect of having
restroom on school enrollment and drop out rates, both of which showed effects
between 5- 12 percentage points. The paper also finds both male and female students
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benefited from building restrooms in schools. The effects likely reflect safety as well
as health benefits for all children. Given the large population in India, schools are
likely to be overpopulated and the spread of infectious diseases among school children
is easier in an unhygienic environment. Having school restrooms are associated not
only with privacy but also with curbing the spread of many infectious diseases.
Moreover, SSHE initiative also educated school children and their parents about
the essential hygiene practices such as to wash hands properly after using restrooms.
Children following these practices at school and home are more likely to stay healthier
than before. Hence, the estimates generated in this paper reflect a combined effect of
safety, privacy, and healthy behavior rather than simply restroom provision bringing
female children back to school.
Finally, building female restroom may have an effect on the age of marriage of
female children, which is another channel of discrimination towards female children.
Parents may decide to allow their female children to continue their education given a
safer environment which may push the age of marriage up. Thus, school infrastructure
improvement may have important positive spillover effects beyond the immediate
gains in human capital.
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2.7 Appendix
The school data from District Information System for Education reports female re-
stroom availability for five discrete categories of schools in India. They are primary
only (standard 1-5), primary with upper primary (standard 1-8), primary with sec-
ondary and higher secondary (standard 1-5 & 9-12), upper primary only (standard
6-8), and upper primary with secondary and higher secondary (standard 8-12). Us-
ing these variable, I create the following measures used in the paper for percentage
of schools with female restrooms for primary, upper primary, secondary, and higher
secondary level of education, respectively.
1. Percentage of schools with female restrooms providing primary education = (Pri-
mary only schools with female restrooms + Primary with upper primary schools
with female restroom + primary with secondary and higher secondary with fe-
male restroom)/ (Total primary only schools + primary with upper primary only
schools + primary with secondary and higher secondary only schools)
2. Percentage of schools with female restrooms providing upper primary education
= (Primary with upper primary schools with female restroom + upper primary
only schools with female restroom + upper primary with secondary and higher
secondary schools with female restrooms)/ (Primary with upper primary schools
+ upper primary only schools + upper primary with secondary and higher sec-
ondary schools)
3. Percentage of schools with female restrooms providing secondary/higher sec-
ondary education = ( primary with secondary and higher secondary schools with
female restroom+ upper primary with secondary and higher secondary schools
with female restrooms)/ (primary with secondary and higher secondary schools
+ upper primary with secondary and higher secondary schools)
4. Percentage of schools providing primary education without female teachers =
(Primary only schools without female teachers + Primary with upper primary
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schools without female teachers + primary with secondary and higher secondary
without female teachers)/ (Total primary only schools + primary with upper pri-
mary only schools + primary with secondary and higher secondary only schools)
5. Percentage of schools providing upper primary education without female teach-
ers= (Primary with upper primary schools without female teachers + upper
primary only schools without female teachers + upper primary with secondary
and higher secondary schools without female teachers)/ (Primary with upper
primary schools + upper primary only schools + upper primary with secondary
and higher secondary schools)
6. Percentage of schools providing secondary/higher secondary education without
female teachers= ( primary with secondary and higher secondary schools without
female teachers+ upper primary with secondary and higher secondary schools
without female teachers)/ (primary with secondary and higher secondary schools
+ upper primary with secondary and higher secondary schools)
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Table 2.1: Urban - Rural change over time descriptive
Rural Urban
Post-2003 Pre-2003 Diff Post-2003 Pre-2003 Diff
% Adult with Primary
Edu
0.79∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.005) 0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Head of HH Female 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Religion is Hindu 0.75∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Females in HH 3.05∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 2.94∗∗∗ 2.96∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.06) (0.07) (0.027) (0.10) (0.11)
Has Electricity 0.67∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Has Water Supply 0.78∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
Has Toilet 0.37∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016)
Has Radio 0.21∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Has TV 0.38∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Has Bicycle 0.52∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Female Political
Candidate
0.09 0.08∗∗∗ 0.002 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Age 11.73∗∗∗ 11.76∗∗∗ - 0.03∗∗∗ 12.21∗∗∗ 12.37∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.033) (0.03) (0.014) (0.030) (0.03)
N 664, 466 111,358 775,824 212, 325 52,962 265,287
Sample is for female children between 6-18 years. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors clustered at district are reported in brackets.
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Table 2.3: Effect of Percent of Schools with Female Restrooms on Higher Secondary Schooling
Panel A: Higher Sec. Completed Panel B: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms ×Rural
0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ - 0.01 0.05∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.03)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms
0.20∗∗ - 0.09∗∗∗ - 0.01 0.0003 0.70∗∗∗ - 0.76∗∗∗ - 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04)
Rural - 0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ - 1.85∗∗∗ - 1.96∗∗∗ - 0.58∗∗∗ - 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03)
Age Group 18 18 18 18 16-18 16-18 16-18 16-18
Covariates No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Academic Year & District
FE
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Atleast Secondary Education No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 65,511 65,511 65,510 35,421 196,022 196,022 189,357 89,961
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for higher secondary school completion (standard 12) and the age group is 18 as a child
enters higher secondary at 16 years of age and completes higher secondary schooling at 18 years of age at least. In Panel B, the outcome variable
is years of education completed within primary school age group 16-18. Sample is for female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of
females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for
having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child,
and several household characteristics. In the fourth column of each panel, I exclude those children who did not complete secondary education.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Percent of Schools with Female Restrooms on Secondary Schooling
Panel A: Secondary Completed Panel B: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms ×Rural
0.13∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.03)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms
0.17∗∗ - 0.14∗∗∗ - 0.05∗∗∗ - 0.04∗ 0.73∗∗∗ - 0.55∗∗∗ - 0.12 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.03)
Rural - 0.29∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ - 1.49∗∗∗ - 1.58∗∗∗ - 0.56∗∗∗ - 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02)
Age Group 16-18 16-18 16-18 16-18 14-16 14-16 14-16 14-16
Covariates No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Academic Year & District
FE
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Atleast Upper Primary
Education
No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 196,022 196,022 196,019 147,921 221,298 221,298 221,292 135,791
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for secondary school completion (standard 10) and the age group is 16-18 as a child enters
secondary at 14 years of age and completes secondary schooling at 16 years of age at least. In Panel B, the outcome variable is years of education
completed within primary school age group 14-16. Sample is for female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Regressors include number of females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for having
electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing state
in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child, and several household characteristics. In the fourth column of each panel, I exclude those
children who did not complete upper primary education.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Percent of Schools with Female Restrooms on Upper Primary Schooling
Panel A: Upper Primary Completed Panel B: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms ×Rural
0.20∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms
0.13∗∗ - 0.08∗∗∗ - 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02 0.47∗∗∗ - 0.23∗∗∗ - 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04)
Rural - 0.27∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ - 0.10∗∗∗ - 1.05∗∗∗ - 1.07∗∗∗ - 0.45∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Age Group 14-18 14-18 14-18 14-18 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14
Covariates No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Academic Year & District
FE
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Excl. Incomplete primary No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 349,755 349,755 349,747 316,827 324,049 324,049 324,037 240,697
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for upper primary school completion (standard 8) and the age group is 14-18 as a child
enters upper primary at 11 years of age and completes upper primary schooling at 14 years of age at least. In Panel B, the outcome variable
is years of education completed within primary school age group 11-14. Sample is for female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of
females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for
having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child,
and several household characteristics. In the fourth column of each panel, I exclude those children who did not complete primary education.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Percent of Schools with Female Restrooms on Primary schooling
Panel A: Primary completed Panel B: Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms ×Rural
0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms
0.04∗∗ - 0.03∗∗∗ - 0.01∗∗∗ -0.004 - 0.35∗∗∗ - 0.06 - 0.01 - 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Rural - 0.17∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ - 0.06∗∗∗ - 0.63∗∗∗ - 0.40∗∗∗ - 0.15∗∗∗ - 0.15∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age Group 11-18 11-18 11-18 11-18 6-11 6-11 6-11 6-11
Covariates No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Academic Year & District
FE
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Excl. Children with No
Schooling
No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 597,322 597,322 597,306 581,808 456, 142 456, 142 456, 121 380,264
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for primary school completion (standard 5) and the age group is 11-18 as a child enters
school at 6 years of age and completes primary schooling at 11 years of age at least. In Panel B, the outcome variable is years of education
completed within primary school age group 6-11. Sample is for female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of females in household, pc.
schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for having female head of the
household, percentage of female political candidate represtenting state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child, and several household
characteristics. In the fourth column of each panel, I exclude those children who never went to school.
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Table 2.7: Effect of Percent of Schools with Restrooms on Higher Secondary Schooling for Male Children
Panel A: Higher Sec. Completed Panel B: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms ×Rural
0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 1.06∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.03)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms
0.14∗∗ - 0.07∗∗∗ - 0.02 0.02 0.70∗∗∗ - 0.76∗∗∗ - 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04)
Rural - 0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ - 1.85∗∗∗ - 1.96∗∗∗ - 0.58∗∗∗ - 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03)
Age Group 18 18 18 18 16-18 16-18 16-18 16-18
Covariates No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Academic Year & District
FE
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Atleast Secondary Education No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 104,037 104,037 104,032 50,657 196,022 196,022 189,357 89,961
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for higher secondary school completion (standard 12) and the age group is 18 as a child
enters higher secondary at 16 years of age and completes higher secondary schooling at 18 years of age at least. In Panel B, the outcome variable
is years of education completed within primary school age group 16-18. Sample is for female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of
females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator
for having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate represtenting state in the Parliament, indicators for age of
the child, and several household characteristics. In the fourth column of each panel, I exclude those children who did not complete secondary
education.
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Table 2.8: Effect of Percent of Schools with Restrooms on Secondary Schooling for male children
Panel A: Secondary Completed Panel B: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms ×Rural
0.12∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.03)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms
0.15∗∗ - 0.15∗∗∗ - 0.08∗∗∗ - 0.07∗ 0.73∗∗∗ - 0.55∗∗∗ - 0.12 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.03)
Rural - 0.22∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ - 1.49∗∗∗ - 1.58∗∗∗ - 0.56∗∗∗ - 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02)
Age Group 16-18 16-18 16-18 16-18 14-16 14-16 14-16 14-16
Covariates No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Academic Year & District
FE
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Atleast Upper Primary
Education
No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 263, 445 263, 445 263, 433 196, 336 221,298 221,298 221,292 135,791
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for secondary school completion (standard 10) and the age group is 16-18 as a child enters
secondary at 14 years of age and completes secondary schooling at 16 years of age at least. In Panel B, the outcome variable is years of education
completed within primary school age group 14-16. Sample is for female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Regressors include number of females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for having
electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing state
in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child, and several household characteristics. In the fourth column of each panel, I exclude those
children who did not complete upper primary education.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Percent of Schools with Restrooms on Upper Primary Schooling for Male Children
Panel A: Upper Primary Completed Panel B: Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms ×Rural
0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms
0.11∗∗ - 0.08∗∗∗ - 0.03∗∗∗ -0.02 0.47∗∗∗ - 0.23∗∗∗ - 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04)
Rural - 0.21∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ - 0.04∗∗∗ - 1.05∗∗∗ - 1.07∗∗∗ - 0.45∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Age Group 14-18 14-18 14-18 14-18 11-14 11-14 11-14 11-14
Covariates No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Academic Year & District
FE
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Excl. Incomplete primary No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 449, 202 449, 202 449, 179 408,392 324,049 324,049 324,037 240,697
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for upper primary school completion (standard 8) and the age group is 14-18 as a child
enters upper primary at 11 years of age and completes upper primary schooling at 14 years of age at least. In Panel B, the outcome variable
is years of education completed within primary school age group 11-14. Sample is for female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of
females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for
having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child,
and several household characteristics. In the fourth column of each panel, I exclude those children who did not complete primary education.
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Table 2.10: Effect of Percent of Schools with Restrooms on Primary Schooling for Male Children
Panel A: Primary completed Panel B: Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms ×Rural
0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
PC. Schools with Female
Restrooms
0.02 - 0.03∗∗∗ - 0.01 -0.006 - 0.35∗∗∗ - 0.06 - 0.01 - 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Rural - 0.13∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ - 0.04∗∗∗ - 0.63∗∗∗ - 0.40∗∗∗ - 0.15∗∗∗ - 0.15∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age Group 11-18 11-18 11-18 11-18 6-11 6-11 6-11 6-11
Covariates No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Academic Year & District
FE
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Excl. Children with No
Schooling
No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 714, 431 714, 431 714, 387 700,911 456, 142 456, 142 456, 121 380,264
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for primary school completion (standard 5) and the age group is 11-18 as a child enters
school at 6 years of age and completes primary schooling at 11 years of age at least. In Panel B, the outcome variable is years of education
completed within primary school age group 6-11. Sample is for female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of females in household, pc.
schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for having female head of
the household, percentage of female political candidate representing state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child, and several household
characteristics. In the fourth column of each panel, I exclude those children who never went to school.
Table 2.11: Effect of Percent of Schools with Female Restrooms on School Completion Rates
Higher Secondary Secondary Upper Primary Primary
Panel A: Backward States
PC. Schools with
Female Restrooms
×Rural
0.04 0.09∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 34,808 15,173 93,784 66,921 170,674 150,157 299,858 288,163
Panel B: Forward States
PC. Schools with
Female Restrooms
×Rural
- 0.07∗∗∗ - 0.001 0.04 0.04∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 34,808 20,248 102,235 81,000 179,073 166,670 297,448 293,645
Age Group 18 18 16-18 16-18 14-18 14-18 11-18 11-18
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year &
District FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excl. Incomplete
Previous level
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for school completion at every level. The age group is restricted as per grade. Sample is for
female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district
are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for
having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing
state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child, and several household characteristics. In the second column of each panel, I exclude those
children who did not complete the previous level of education.
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Table 2.12: Effect of Percent of Schools with Female Restrooms on Years of Education
Higher Secondary Secondary Upper Primary Primary
Panel A: Backward States
PC. Schools with
Female Restrooms
×Rural
0.03 0.16∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.04 0.69∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Observations 34,808 15,173 93,784 66,921 170,674 150,157 299,858 288,163
Panel B: Forward States
PC. Schools with
Female Restrooms
×Rural
0.03∗∗∗ - 0.01 0.33∗∗ 0.05 0.40∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 34,808 20,248 102,235 81,000 179,073 166,670 297,448 293,645
Age Group 18 18 16-18 16-18 14-18 14-18 11-18 11-18
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year &
District FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excl. Incomplete
Previous level
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is years of education completed. The age group is restricted as per the age for grade. Sample is for
female children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district
are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for
having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing
state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child, and several household characteristics. In the second column of level of education, I exclude
those children who did not complete previous level of education.
Table 2.13: Effect of Percent of Schools with Restrooms on School Completion Rates
Higher Secondary Secondary Upper Primary Primary
Panel A: Backward States
PC. Schools with
Female Restrooms
×Rural
0.03∗ 0.03 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 52,559 23,012 131,015 94,021 227,485 203,258 368,243 358,550
Panel B: Forward States
PC. Schools with
Female Restrooms
×Rural
- 0.01 - 0.001 0.06∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 51,473 27,645 132,418 102,315 221,694 205,134 346,144 342,361
Age Group 18 18 16-18 16-18 14-18 14-18 11-18 11-18
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year &
District FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excl. Incomplete
Previous level
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator for school completion at every level. The age group is restricted as per grade. Sample is for
male children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district
are reported in brackets. Regressors include number of females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for
having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing
state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child, and several household characteristics. In the second column of each panel, I exclude those
children who did not complete the previous level of education.
92
Table 2.14: Effect of Percent of Schools with Restrooms School on Years of Education
Higher Secondary Secondary Upper Primary Primary
Panel A: Backward States
PC. Schools with
Female Restrooms
×Rural
0.58∗∗∗ - 0.005 0.57∗∗∗ 0.01 0.68∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 52,559 23,012 131,015 94,021 227,485 203,258 368,243 358,550
Panel B: Forward States
PC. Schools with
Female Restrooms
×Rural
0.30∗ 0.05 0.47∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.07) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 51,473 27,645 132,418 102,315 221,694 205,134 346,144 342,361
Age Group 18 18 16-18 16-18 14-18 14-18 11-18 11-18
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year &
District FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excl. Incomplete
Previous level
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: In panel A, the outcome variable is years of education completed. The age group is restricted as per the age for grade. Sample is for male
children only. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at district are
reported in brackets. Regressors include number of females in household, pc. schools without female teacher, religion dummies, indicator for
having electricity, and female literacy rate, indicator for having female head of the household, percentage of female political candidate representing
state in the Parliament, indicators for age of the child, and several household characteristics. In the second column of level of education, I exclude
those children who did not complete previous level of education.
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Chapter 3
Terrorism and Early Childhood Health Outcomes:
Evidence from Pakistan (Co-authored with Umair Khalil & Daniel
Grossman)
3.1 Introduction
Early childhood, including the in-utero period, is an important developmental period
(see e.g. Heckman 2006; Barker 1990). Violence and other stressors can have negative
effects on the health of both mothers and their children. Thus, violent incidents
suffered in-utero and in early childhood can have critical impacts on childhood and
later life health and human capital outcomes (see e.g., Barker, 1990; Almond and
Currie, 2011). Terrorism and violent attacks on civilian populations are examples of
events that may lead to increased stress and negative health outcomes for children,
and they have increased precipitously across the globe in recent decades (Backer
et al., 2016). These events lead to fatalities, destroy infrastructure, and create an
environment of fear, which can have both short- and long-term consequences on health
and affect health through numerous potential mechanisms.
A drastic and sudden rise in terrorist and violent incidents in Pakistan has occurred
since the mid 2000s after more than a decade of relative peace, as depicted in Figure
A.3. According to the Global Terrorism Database, around 13% of attacks worldwide
occurred in Pakistan from 2006-2011, our study period (GTDNational Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2018). Further-
94
more, Pakistan already fares poorly in basic health indicators: it ranks 8th highest
in the world in proportion of children under 5 being stunted (WHOUnited Nations
Children’s Fund, World Health Organization, The World Bank, 2018); it has the 6th
lowest health expenditure to GDP ratio; and it has only 0.6 hospital beds per 1000
people (WHO World Health Organization, 2018).
In this paper, we explore whether exposure to terrorist incidents contributes to
worse health outcomes among young children in Pakistan, specifically those aged be-
tween 0 and 5 years. We exploit spatial and temporal variation in the occurrence of
terrorist incidents across tehsils (sub-districts) in the Pakistani province of Punjab.
We focus on exposure to terrorist attacks, both in-utero and post-birth, and study its
effect on a variety of health outcomes. Our main outcome variables are binary indi-
cators for the child being stunted or wasted (classified low weight) based on z-scores
for age and gender. Measures based on height are considered particularly crucial
variables to study in early childhood development in developing countries (Currie
and Vogl, 2013). Long term effects of stunting are important given the documented
relationships between stature and cognitive ability and eventual labor market out-
comes (Case and Paxson, 2008). On the other hand, weight outcomes might be more
likely to capture fluctuations in nutrition and other needs of the child in the short
run. Vaccination take-up represents a potential mechanism through which exposure
to violence may affect health and is a potential marker of health care access.
It is crucial to note that for our analysis to estimate plausibly causal impacts of
exposure to terrorism, the employed research design first must handle the potential
endogeneity of the incidence of terrorism. For instance, one can expect terrorist
attacks not to be randomly ‘assigned’ across space and time, which can then manifest
itself in correlations between tehsil level characteristics and likelihood of terrorist
incidents. While we do not observe an exhaustive list of tehsil level measures, we can
check the existence of such correlations using individual and household level measures
from our survey data. Isolating variation in terrorism within tehsils by employing
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fixed effects is likely to allay such potential selection issues as detailed in section 3.2.
Furthermore, one might still be concerned that the actual number of attacks instead
can be correlated with some unobservable characteristics of the target population
even after controlling for time invariant spatial fixed effects. Therefore, in addition to
tehsil fixed effect we also employ tehsil specific linear trend specifications as well as a
maternal fixed effect based strategy, comparing children born to the same mother but
with different exposure to violent incidents due to the timing of their birth. While
this may not completely address these concerns, the robustness of our estimates to
these various specifications provides compelling evidence that our results represent
causal impacts.
Our paper contributes to the growing empirical literature that has documented
the negative impacts of exposure to violence on health outcomes at various points in
the life cycle. These studies have explored this question using data from numerous
countries, consistently estimating a robust negative effect of exposure to violence
on health outcomes, primarily using difference-in-differences techniques or maternal
fixed effects for identification (See for example: Palestine (Mansour and Rees, 2012);
Eritrea and Ethiopia (Akresh et al., 2012b); Nigeria (Akresh et al., 2012a) Korea (Lee,
2014); Germany during World War II (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2017); and Mexico (Brown,
2018) among others.) Similarly, using quasi-experimental variation from landmine
explosions in Colombia, Camacho (2008) documents a significant impact on birth
weight, while Koppensteiner and Manacorda (2016) find a negative effect of homicide
prevalence on infant health in Brazil. Terrorism also effects fertility (Berrebi and
Ostwald, 2014), diet (Dabalen and Paul, 2014), educational attainment (Leon, 2012),
human capital development (Duque, 2017) and women’s health (Grimard and Laszlo,
2014). These are potential mechanisms through which the documented impacts on
child health may operate. Our study underscores receipt of vaccines and access to
medical care as additional important mechanisms through which early life violence
may affect health.
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The two closest papers to ours are Mansour and Rees (2012) and Akresh et al.
(2012b). Mansour and Rees (2012), using variation in non-combatant deaths to Pales-
tinians during the second Intifada fighting between Israel and Palestine, find that an
increase in deaths in-utero causes worse infant health at birth. Akresh et al. (2012b)
focuses on pre- and post-birth violence, controlling for migration patterns and mater-
nal fixed effects during the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict. Their results are specific to
a war context and they measure intensity of the conflict by the number of internally
displaced persons per capita. They report decreased height for age for children born
both before and during the war, highlighting the importance of focusing on violence
after birth as well as in-utero.
Our paper differs from the previous literature in two related aspects. First, most
of the literature cited above focuses on prolonged conflicts and wars that are more
likely to induce internal migration and displacement. This migration complicates
inference on the parameter of interest. Akresh et al. (2012b) do a particularly good
job of dealing with this concern by using data on the exact location of a child during
the war. Our focus on Punjab, which did not have an ongoing insurgency or active
conflict, alleviates this concern. We discuss this in greater detail in the next section.
Second, studies focusing on sustained violence but not full-blown wars, such that they
are less likely to induce internal migration, generally have relatively lower intensity of
violence which can make subsequent effects harder to detect (Ioannidis et al., 2017).
In our sample period, 45% of attacks in Punjab had more than 10 recorded fatalities.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Terrorism in Pakistan
Following the September 11 attacks, Pakistan became a front line state involved in
the so-called War on Terror. Before its involvement in the Afghan war in 2001, Pak-
istan was mostly a peaceful country despite some previous sporadic violent incidents
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depicted in Figure A.3. Pakistan did not contribute any active military personnel to
the coalition, but it provided access to its airspace and transport network for facil-
itating military operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan shares a 2,430 kilometer long,
largely porous, border with Afghanistan and ethnically similar populations inhabit
both sides. The Pashtun tribes on the Pakistani side of the border, referred to as the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), provided refuge to the Afghan Taliban
and Al-Qaeda fighters fleeing from Afghanistan following the US-led invasion and
actively participated in fighting what they saw as an occupying force in Afghanistan
(Rubin and Rashid, 2008; Shah, 2012). Consequently, the Pakistani military launched
an offensive in FATA in 2004 to curb the involvement of Pakistani citizens in aiding
and abetting militants in Afghanistan fighting against the US led coalition (Abbas,
2004). Militant organizations based in FATA, responded to this offensive by targeting
civilian non-combatants in Pakistani urban centers.
An additional trigger of terrorist activity in Pakistan occurred in July 2007 in
the Pakistani capital of Islamabad (Hussain, 2010). The Pakistani military launched
Operation Sunrise, referred to as the Siege of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), to clear the
mosque of suspected militants. While officials reported approximately 100 casualties
of militants with links to Al-Qaeda, others claimed that the casualty figure was much
higher and included unarmed women and children. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan,
the main terrorist organization in Pakistan, formed in the aftermath of the Siege and
vowed to take revenge for the deaths, leading to an increase in violence and intensity
of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. While the history and impact of the incident is
nuanced and complex (see e.g. Hussain, 2010, 2017), a key aspect of this raid and its
aftermath for our identification strategy is that it was completely unanticipated.
This drastic rise in violent incidents has greatly affected Pakistan both in terms of
economic and human losses. Terrorist activity caused $118 billion in economic losses
between 2002 and 2016 in Pakistan (Pakistan Economic Survey 2016). In addition,
more than 60,000 Pakistanis have died in terror-related activities since 2002, a third
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of whom were civilian non-combatants (Crawford, 2017). However, we note that
the majority of these deaths were in the active insurgency areas in FATA. These
aggregate level statistics imply that the consequences of terrorist attacks in Pakistan
are multifaceted: individuals suffer economic hardship, stress, and fear of losing one’s
life as a result of the increased incidence of violence.
The survey data used in our analysis, and outlined in detail in the next section,
was conducted in 2011. We focus on children aged between 0 and 5 years. Terrorist
activity between 2006 and 2011 provides us with variation in our ‘treatment of inter-
est’. Our data is from Punjab, the most populous province in Pakistan. Figure A.1
shows trends in attacks and fatalities in Punjab that closely mirror the overall trend
for the entire country. Approximately 1,000 individuals were killed in Punjab over
our study period.
Although terrorist activity in Punjab is only a fraction of that experienced by
Pakistan as a whole in the sample period, our focus on Punjab stems from two
concerns that are likely to help us with the causal identification of the parameter of
interest. First, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, the other province in which violent incidents
increased drastically, was virtually an active war zone due to a home-grown insurgency
in the border area of FATA. Proximity to a conflict zone is likely associated with
potential confounding from internal migration and displacement of refugees fleeing
the conflict between the Pakistan army and militants. For instance, a 2009 operation
conducted in the province resulted in over 1.2 million refugees migrating to southern
cities to escape the war. Punjab is less likely to suffer from this concern and there is
no documented wide scale internal migrations from or within the province. Second,
Punjab is administratively divided into 150 tehsils or sub-districts and we observe this
geographic marker in our MICS data, which provides spatial and temporal variation
in attacks at a relatively finer level. In addition, among the health survey based data
sets, Punjab has the largest sample size which is particularly helpful in implementing
a maternal fixed effect based estimation methodology. We exclude Pakistan’s two
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other provinces, Balochistan and Sindh, because MICS data for both provinces lack
a tehsil identifier and provide information only at the much larger district level. This
provides a much coarser measure of treatment exposure given that Balochistan has
only 32 districts, while Sindh has only 29 districts.
Figure A.2 plots heat maps of the number of fatalities per attack by tehsils for each
year between 2006 and 2011. Punjab was relatively peaceful in 2006 but starting in
2007 terrorist activity increased, varying by time and space the exposure to violence
across pregnancies and tehsils in Punjab.
3.2.2 Mechanisms
Violence is an important correlate of preterm birth, low birth weight, and other mea-
sures of infant and early childhood health. It may affect health through numerous
mechanisms including increased psychological stress for the child and/or family; re-
duced parental investment in a child’s human capital; malnutrition due to disruptions
of market activities; infrastructure destruction which may crowd out resources for eco-
nomic development or health services; and reduced access to medical care. We discuss
each of these pathways in turn below.
First, psychological stress on both the mother and child in response to terrorist
activity can directly affect health. Maternal cortisol levels are correlated with fetal
cortisol levels (Talge et al., 2007). Aizer et al. (2016) use a maternal fixed effect
model and find little evidence of negative birth outcomes from elevated cortisol, but
large effects on educational attainment and verbal IQ at age 7. Haushofer and Fehr
(2014) provide a review of the interrelationship between poverty and stress: stress
leads to risk-averse decision making and less direct investment in offspring, leading to
worse long-term outcomes. Experiencing an additional disruptive occurrence such as
a terrorist attack may exacerbate this risk aversion further for low income individuals.
Stress affects infants and children directly, not just through a maternal stress chan-
nel (Saridjan et al., 2010; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014). For instance, sleep patterns
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and early morning cortisol levels are adversely impacted for adolescents exposed to
neighborhood-level violent crime incidents (Heissel et al., 2017). Importantly, chil-
dren’s response to attacks may be modulated by adolescent emotional characteristics
like hopefulness (Fletcher, 2018).
Second, attacks on public areas may disrupt local markets directly or through fear,
dissuading individuals from traveling to nearby economic centers. Understanding the
effect of terrorism on local and city market activities is an understudied topic (Desai,
2017). This can potentially reduce overall familial resources which can affect health
in myriad ways. For instance, it can lead to a less healthy diet because mutually
beneficial trade cannot occur or because one’s budget constraint binds, limiting the
amount or quality of food, increasing rates of malnutrition and stunting (Bozzoli
and Quintana-Domeque, 2014; Lindo, 2011; Onis et al., 2013). Shah et al. (2003)
provide descriptive evidence that stunting in Pakistan among children under age
3 is associated with low socioeconomic status, while terrorist activities decreased
economic development substantially in Pakistan (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2016).
Attacks that target civilian populations likely exacerbate stunting and malnutrition
among the most vulnerable populations.
Third, terrorist attacks lead to greater investment in defense against attacks (Eck-
stein and Tsiddon, 2004). Together with decreased economic development, this likely
crowds out potential investments in healthcare as well as private investment (Filmer
et al., 2000; Jain et al., 2015; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Llussa and Tavares, 2011).
In developing economies, individuals living in smaller areas may have to travel fur-
ther for health care (Filmer et al., 2000), while wealthy and urban women are more
likely to give birth in an institutional setting (Jain et al., 2015). Because higher stress
exposure is associated with risk aversion (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014), parents may
be unwilling to take children to receive basic medical services after violent attacks.
To minimize exposure to terrorism, individuals may receive health care at smaller
clinics tended by less experienced healthcare professionals closer to their home and
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may forego followup care out of fear. Finally, individuals may be less likely to re-
ceive basic health care including inoculations against preventable diseases, suggesting
restrictions on both quality and quantity of care received.
The pathways delineated above provide support for a negative health effect of
violent attacks in one’s local area. While the results of these previous studies are not
necessarily specific to children under age 5, they provide evidence of both short- and
long-term effects of stress on health. Addtionally, effects of violence and stress at
later ages such as during adolescence are not evidence against the existence of these
associations at younger ages. Determining through which of these channels this effect
occurs is difficult. We contribute to this literature by attempting to tease out the
effects of terrorism attacks on health, focusing on vaccination receipt as a proxy for
receipt of health care.
3.3 Data and Methods
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We use data from two sources: the 2011 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)
provides data on children’s health outcomes while the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) provides terrorism data.
MICS is an international household survey program for children and women con-
ducted by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund in collabora-
tion with the Government of Punjab and UN Development Program. Its primary ob-
jective is to monitor the progress of children towards Millennium Development goals.
MICS covers 102,545 households in 36 districts of Punjab which are further divided
into 150 tehsils. For children under age 5, interviewers collect detailed information
on individuals’ source of nutrition. They also measure children’s heights and weights.
For children under age 3, MICS collects immunization histories from immunization
cards, if available, or asks respondents about children’s vaccinations. Additionally, it
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collects basic household demographic characteristics as well as prenatal care history,
and newborn health.
GTD collects information on terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 through
2015 and has detailed data on date, place, fatalities, and nature of attack. For each
child, we merge the number of attacks and fatalities that occurred during gestation
period and post birth using their tehsil of residence. We use ArcGIS to geocode all
attacks that occurred within Pakistan over our study period to the tehsil in which
they occurred. The mean number of attacks during gestation per children is 0.11 and
the average after birth is 0.52.
We present descriptive statistics of the sample in Table A.1. The first column
contains the sample of children born to a woman who gave birth at least twice during
the sample period, our mother fixed effect sample. Here we report statistics on our
estimation sample, which consists of families where multiple siblings are observed for
comparability between our tehsil and mother fixed effect specifications. Estimated
effects from the full sample are very similar to the results presented in the paper.
Column (2) contains demographic characteristics of the children and households in
tehsils in which an attack occurred at some point during the sample period, while
column (3) limits the sample to areas in which an attack did not occur. Column
(4) takes the difference of columns (2) and (3) and tests for statistical differences
between the two. Tehsils with an attack had mothers and heads of households with
lower socioeconomic status in terms of educational attainment and wealth score. For
the outcome variables, approximately 33 percent of the sample children were stunted
and 14 percent were severely stunted. 30 percent were low weight and 10 percent were
very low weight. Rates of stunting and low weight were higher in areas that received
an attack during our study period. While significant differences exist between the
columns it is important to note that these differences exist on the extensive margin
of whether an area ever had an attack, whereas our study exploits variation in the
timing of attacks as well as within mother variation.
103
Missing data on covariates is minimal, less than 1.5%, conditional on non-missing
outcome data. However, data on health and weight of the child is missing for around
11% of the observations. We do not employ imputation techniques as they are gener-
ally not recommended for outcome variables (Perales and Todd, 2018; Allison, 2001)
as impuation models can potentially introduce bias.
3.3.2 Methodology
Our measures of exposure to terrorism is the ratio of fatalities per terrorist attack,
which we term as the ‘intensity of attack.’ Any correlation between the choice of
location by potential perpetrators and unobserved individual characteristics of the
local population is likely to persist only at the extensive margin of the attack it-
self. The actual number of fatalities per attack is more likely to be a function of
quasi-random elements specific to the day and exact location of the attack in a given
city. For instance, whether the suicide attacker was able to by-pass multiple secu-
rity barriers owing to security lapses, and whether he was able to detonate at the
optimal time for maximum impact, which are hard to predict ex-ante. Additionally,
how individuals and governments react is likely to be a function of both fatalities and
attacks. Government investment in security increases in response to attacks (Eckstein
and Tsiddon, 2004), while private investment decreases more due to fatalities than
injuries (Llussa and Tavares, 2011). Individuals tend to value reductions in fatali-
ties caused by terrorist attacks more than natural disaster fatalities (Viscusi, 2009),
suggesting terrorism-related fatalities have more salience to the population at large.
Furthermore, high intensity attacks are likely to have more economic consequences
and cause more stress and fear as well.
Appendix table A.5 presents results from a regression of the incidence of our mea-
sures of terrorism on observable individual and household characteristics of respon-
dents in our sample. Importantly, this test is on the intensive margin and we find
little evidence of an empirical relationship between either the intensity or the fa-
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tality measure and observable characteristics of individuals living in terror affected
regions. Columns (1) and (3) show that, even without controlling for tehsil fixed
effects, the intensity of attacks is uncorrelated with maternal and household charac-
teristics. Columns (2) and (4) then add tehsil fixed effects and find similar results.
Columns (5) to (8) provide similar estimates for the number of fatalities measure
of terrorist activity. However, some covariates for maternal education outcomes are
marginally significant at the 10% level even in the fully controlled specification. The
maternal fixed effect analysis, detailed below, is motivated by the potential existence
of such correlations.
With the above discussion in mind, we estimate the following baseline regression,
Hijt = φ+ αj + λt + β1(Intensity PreBirthijt)
+ β2(Intensity PostBirthijt) + γXijt + εijt (3.1)
where Hijt represents a health outcome for child i living in tehsil j in year t, αj
represents a tehsil fixed effect, which accounts for time invariant characteristics of the
area, and λt represents calendar birth month and separately birth year fixed effects,
which control for seasonal variation in health and general trends in health over this
time period. Xijt represents various maternal and household level controls, including
age of mother at birth of child, a dummy for first child, whether child was breastfed,
age of mother at marriage, parental education, and a household wealth index. εijt
represents a random idiosyncratic error term, clustered at the tehsil level to allow for
serial correlation. Our main parameters of interest, β1 and β2, capture the effect of
exposure to terrorism in utero and post-birth. We present results from specifications
using the total number of fatalities in a tehsil to measure exposure to terrorism instead
of an intensity of attack measure as a robustness test in Appendix Table A.7 and find
similar results. We observe the month and year of birth for each child, and exact date
of birth for most children, but not their gestational length, hence we define in utero
exposure as 9 months prior to the observed date of birth. We also augment equation
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(1) by including a tehsil specific time trend in some of the specifications below.
Our main heath outcomes are measures of stunting and low weight. For height
we consider whether the child is classified as stunted or severely stunted defined as
height-for-age-and-sex z-score below -2 and -3, respectively. We define low weight
and very low weight analogously. Our choice of these binary indicators as the main
variable of interests is partially driven by the context of child health in Pakistan.
Over 80% of children under 5 are classified as being below ‘median’ for their age
and gender and this number is even higher for weight. In such a setting, using a
continuous z-score, which estimates average effects, might mask crucial details at the
lower end of the respective distributions. Nevertheless, for completeness we present
results for continuous z-scores for both height and weight below as well. We also
analyze the likelihood of the child being vaccinated for two different inoculations: the
tuberculosis vaccine and the pentavalent vaccine.
Although tehsil fixed effects are likely to account for time invariant unobservable
differences between regions that are and are not exposed to terrorism we estimate an
even more saturated model by adding maternal fixed effects to equation (1):
Hijtm = φ+ αm + λt + β1(Intensity PreBirthijt)
+ β2(Intensity PostBirthijt) + γXijtm + εijtm (3.2)
where all variables are defined as before except we include an additional index,
m, denoting the same mother. The mother fixed effect, αm, allows us to compare
children born to the same mother but with varying levels of terrorism exposure.
This specification likely accounts for any remaining unobservable differences between
mothers or households not captured by equation (1). Rates of divorce are extremely
low in Pakistan hence it is safe to assume that mother and household unobservables
will closely track each other. The inclusion of αm subsumes the tehsil fixed effect, αj,
from equation (1). Xijtm includes only maternal characteristics that vary between
births like whether the child was ever breastfed and the age of mother at birth. To
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make estimates from equation (1) and (2) comparable, we limit all analyses for height
and weight to mothers who report information on two or more children during sample
period.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Height and Weight
Table A.2 presents results from our baseline specifications given in equations (1)
and (2) using our intensity of attack measure of exposure to terrorism. For ease of
interpretation, we transform all estimated effects of exposure to terrorism into changes
per 1000 children. Columns (1) and (5) include tehsil, month and year of birth fixed
effects. Conditional on terrorism exposure being uncorrelated with predetermined
individual level characteristics this specification captures the effect of exposure to
terrorism on health outcomes. In Panel A, a 1 SD increase in the intensity of attack,
which amounts to 2.4 fatalities per attack in our data, in utero leads to approximately
4 to 5 more children per 1000 being classified as stunted and as severely stunted in
regions experiencing terrorism. This effect is substantially larger for post-birth attacks
and leads to 13 more children per 1000 with stunted height. Results for severely
stunted height are qualitatively similar, but lack statistical significance. In columns
(2) and (6) we add maternal and household level controls. Our estimated coefficients
change only marginally, as one would expect if terrorist activity is exogenous to
the characteristics of the local population. This corroborates our section 3 discussion
based on appendix table A.5 and presents indirect evidence that spurious correlations
between exposure to terrorism and individual level characteristics are unlikely to bias
our results.
Two recent papers, Kahn-Lang and Lang (2018) and Mora and Reggio (2017),
have underscored the importance of flexibly incorporating potential time trends at
the spatial unit level in a difference-in-differences analysis. Following their recommen-
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dations, in columns (3) and (7), as an alternative way of controlling for potentially
spurious trends, we add tehsil-specific linear time trends. Our estimates are robust
to this flexible specification.
We can only test the exogeneity of observable covariates in our data. If terror-
ist activity is correlated with unobservable individual level characteristics then our
equation (1) estimates would not provide the causal effect of interest. We therefore
estimate equation (2) which includes a maternal fixed effect and present results in
columns (4) and (8). Mother fixed effects should conceivably remove confounding
from unobservable mother characteristics as long as these unobservables do not vary
over time within mothers. Our estimated effects change slightly in magnitude but,
given that we have less variation to exploit as a result of comparing children born
to the same mother, our standard errors increase substantially. A 1 SD increase in
attack intensity pre-birth is associated with 4 more children per 1000 being classified
as stunted. We estimate a slightly larger magnitude of 5 more births per 1000 for
pre-birth attacks on severely stunted children and the effect is precisely estimated as
well. Our estimate for post birth attacks is larger with a 1 SD increase in the attack
intensity, around 2.6 deaths per attack, leads to around 18 more children per 1000
(p < 0.05) being classified as stunted. Akresh et al. (2012a) find reduced stature of
individuals exposed during adolescense to the Nigerian Civil War. This suggests a po-
tentially important role of concurrent nutrition and adequate health care in children’s
height and weight.
Table A.2 presents a similar analysis for being classified as low weight (weight-
for-age-and-sex z-score < -2) and very low weight (weight-for-age-and-sex z-score
< -3). For low weight, we estimate a statistically significant effect only for post-
birth exposure to terrorism with a 1 SD increase in intensity leading to 8 to 12
more children per 1000 being classified as low weight depending on the specification
used. However, for very low weight the estimated effect is concentrated in pre-birth
attacks and is robustly and precisely estimated in all specifications. We highlight
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two important aspects of these results. First, our point estimates for post-birth are
still fairly large but are much more imprecisely estimated than pre-birth attacks.
Second, this potentially hints at the existence of heterogeneous treatment effects
especially at the lower end of the weight distribution. This would be particularly true
if children exposed to terrorism in-utero are more likely to be born premature and are
in turn then also more likely to be severely underweight. Unfortunately, we do not
observe the exact gestation of children in our data and hence cannot empirically isolate
whether pre-birth terrorism is reducing child weight due to an increased incidence of
prematurity. We discuss this concern in more detail in Section 4.3. Finally, once
again our estimated effects are robust to the inclusion of tehsil-specific linear time
trends in columns (3) and (7) and mother fixed effects in columns (4) and (8).
In Panel B of Table A.2 and A.3 we present results for the actual z-scores for both
health measures. Although the point estimates are negative, they are generally small
and only statistically significant for pre-birth from columns (1) to (3). This is not
necessarily surprising if children at the lower end of the height and weight distribu-
tions are more likely to be impacted by exposure to terrorism, which is captured by
our binary indicators above. In a recent study on the Nigerian Civil War, Akresh
et al. (2017) find analogous results with impacts concentrated at the lower end of the
distribution.
Finally, as a test of whether limiting our analysis sample to mothers who report
multiple births in the past five years biases our findings, we report results for the full
sample including mothers reporting a single birth in Appendix Table A.6. The results
are remarkably similar across outcomes and specifications, except for likelihood for
low weight where we find a much stronger effect of exposure to terrorism in-utero
compared to our baseline specification in Table A.3.
3.4.2 Vaccination Take-up
Table A.4 explores whether exposure to terrorism, while pregnant, dissuades new
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mothers from taking their newborns to receive critical vaccination regimes. We do
not include maternal fixed effects in these models because we only have data on
children under age 3, greatly reducing our overall sample size and specifically our
sample of mothers with multiple children. This is an interesting outcome in its own
right, but also may be a mechanism to explain later childhood adverse outcomes
presented above. The tuberculosis (TB) vaccine, recommended by the WHO to be
administered as soon as possible after birth, is particularly important in Pakistan due
to its high TB prevalence rate (Khan et al., 2017). Given the recommended timing of
the administration of the vaccine, we construct windows of 30, 60, and 90 days prior
to the exact date of birth of the child and measure the exposure to terrorism that the
mother experienced in these relevant windows. Our outcome variable captures the
extreme event of mothers completely avoiding vaccination take-up, and takes the value
1 if the child is ever vaccinated and zero otherwise. The likely mechanism is stress
and fear related, with a deteriorating security situation making it much more costly
for mothers to risk taking their young children to local health facilities. Pakistan
has a sparse coverage of health facilities and in some instances mothers may need to
travel substantial distances to get to the nearest medical facility.
In Table A.4, Panel A Columns (1) to (3) estimate that a 1 SD increase in attack
intensity before birth leads to between 2 and 7 fewer children per 1000 being admin-
istered the tuberculosis vaccine. Panel B present results for the pentavalent vaccine
which provides children with immunity against: Haemophilus Influenza type B (a
bacteria that causes meningitis, pneumonia and otitis), whooping cough, tetanus,
hepatitis B, and diphtheria. A 1 SD increase in the attack intensity in the last 2 or 3
months of pregnancy leads to between 7 and 8 fewer children per 1000 receiving the
vaccine.
The consistently negative findings for both vaccines provide evidence that a dete-
riorating security situation may reduce access to health services, which is a potential
mechanism for explaining our earlier reported findings on height and weight based
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health outcomes. If violent attacks cause mothers to avoid taking their children for
crucial vaccines right after birth then one can reasonably extrapolate that bouts of
illnesses and childhood diseases are also likely to go untreated or under-treated due to
the external increased cost of traveling to health facilities following violent incidents.
Additionally, health workers may be direct targets of terrorism which further decreases
health care availability (Pedersen, 2002). This dilatory effect likely compounds over
the life cycle of a young child, manifesting itself in worse health outcomes.
3.4.3 Limitations and Robustness Checks
We recognize several limitations and potential sources of bias in our estimates, in-
cluding migration, gestational age, and endogenous fertility. We perform several
sensitivity analyses which we include in an online appendix and outline below. First,
we cannot determine from our data whether a mother moves during our sample pe-
riod. Based on reports from non-governmental organizations, internal migration in
Pakistan during our study period was limited to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and to a lesser
extent Balochistan provinces. We could find no evidence of internal migration within
Punjab. To the extent that conflict-induced migration did occur but we fail to cap-
ture it due to data constraints, one would expect women to move from areas of higher
violence to areas of lower violence. Given we classify all women geographically based
on their location during their 2011 survey, we would expect our results to be a lower
bound on the true effect of violence on health due to concerns akin to contamination.
Second, we do not observe gestational age and cannot control for potential selec-
tion and scarring in who gives birth (Bozzoli et al., 2009). If violence in utero affects
gestational age, this could have long term effects on health as measured by height
or weight. While this effect will be captured by our estimates, the policy response
to decreased height and weight due to a reduction in gestational age may differ from
that of a decrease in heigh and weight separate from a change in gestational age.
Previous work focusing on terrorist activity in Spain, with a very large sample size,
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finds no effect on gestational age (Quintana-Domeque and Ródenas-Serrano, 2017).
In online appendix table A.9, we estimate our equations separately by trimester. Be-
cause we do not observe gestational age, we proxy for gestational age using 270 days
before date of birth. Consistent with previous literature, we find effects concentrated
in the early trimesters of pregnancy especially for stunting (see e.g. Camacho, 2008;
Koppensteiner and Manacorda, 2016). Following previous literature that finds worse
maternal nutrition immediately before pregnancy is associated with worse birth out-
comes (King, 2016; Grieger et al., 2014), we estimate the impact of violence 9 months
before conception on child health outcomes in online appendix table A.10. We find
no effect of pre-pregnancy attacks on height, but find fairly large effects on very low
weight.
Another potential concern is differential selection into fertility, which may manifest
as either women choosing not to become pregnant through behavioral changes such as
increased contraceptive use or decreased sexual activity, or through biological mech-
anisms such that fetuses that actually come to term may be healthier as higher rates
of stress related to violence may increase the rate of miscarriages, especially among
fetuses with the lowest health endowments (Bozzoli et al., 2009; Almond, 2006). To
address potential endogenous fertility concerns, we investigate birth spacing and rates
of contraceptive use and find no evidence of differential time between births or rates
of contraceptive use based on intensity of exposure to terrorist attacks.
As a final robustness check, we explore spillovers in attacks from neighboring tehsils
in Appendix Table A.11. If terrorist activity in a broad region disrupts transportation
infrastructure and supply routes of goods, like perishable food items, then one might
expect significant impacts of violence in even neighboring areas that are different from
the area of residence of the child. On the other hand, if the effects are primarily driven
by stress related channels then one is more likely to find impacts concentrated only in
the tehsil of residence of the mother and the child. These results are never statistically
significant, implying a very localized effect of violent attacks. Overall, these findings
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suggest a larger role for stress and fear based channels explaining the adverse effects
documented in our study, since these are particularly likely to be salient as a function
of proximity to the attack.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effect of terrorism on health outcomes of children in
Pakistan. We document higher rates of low height and low weight incidence among
children under age 5 that are exposed to terrorist activity. Our analysis also explores
the timings of these attacks and finds substantial impacts for post-natal exposure to
violence on child health as well. While our in utero results reinforce the importance
of maternal health while pregnant, post pregnancy results highlight the incomplete
picture provided by focusing only on the in-utero time period. Given the long-term
effects of in utero health shocks and early childhood health, these results are likely
lower bounds (Almond and Currie, 2011; Heckman et al., 2013).
Our results support the idea that these health effects likely operate through re-
duced access to and receipt of medical care. While we can only investigate vaccination
take up, we consider this a proxy for general health care receipt, especially for preven-
tive care. We find reduced vaccination take up, which may suggest that following an
attack, incidence of preventable diseases may increase. From a psychological perspec-
tive, women may be more afraid to travel to a physician and the stress of the attack
may have a direct negative effect on the health on the child. From an infrastructure
perspective, attacks may damage medical facilities and/or transportation infrastruc-
ture, decreasing the supply of either medical care or transportation to a doctor. Given
the adverse effects of early childhood shocks on adult outcomes, adequate health and
human capital interventions should be a major policy goal in regions suffering from
sustained terrorist and violent activities.
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A.1 Further Robustness Check
In this section, we implement a number of robustness checks on the baseline estimates
presented in the main text. We first investigate our findings by the trimester of attack
of the mother’s pregnancy and explore heterogeneity in this dimension. Next we
explore whether attacks suffered prior to pregnancy have any impacts on the health
of the child. Finally, section 7.3 explores whether attacks in neighbouring tehsils also
impact child health as opposed to terrorism having a fairly localized effect.
A.1.1 Alternative Specifications
A.1.1.1 Attacks By Trimesters
The medical and biological literature has argued for the importance of earlier stages
of pregnancy in determining eventual birth outcomes particularly the observed gesta-
tional age of the fetus (McLean et al., 1995). Because of these biological mechanisms,
much of the literature exploring incidence of violence on child health has focused on
negative shocks particularly during the first trimester of pregnancy. Camacho (2008)
and Koppensteiner and Manacorda (2016) among others find robust evidence of in-
creased violent activity during the first trimester of gestation adversely impacting
health outcomes at birth.
Although we do not observe the exact gestational age of children in our sample,
we nevertheless attempt such an analysis by splitting the 270 days before the date
of birth, our window of pre-birth attacks in the above analysis, into three individual
trimesters. Table A.9 presents results from such an analysis for our height and weight
outcomes. Our estimates corroborate the findings in the literature with the pre-
birth effects from our baseline specifications being concentrated in the earlier phases
of pregnancy for stunting. For instance, in our fully controlled, tehsil fixed effect
specification in column (3) of Panel A, a 1 SD increase in attack intensity in the first
trimester of pregnancy leads to 5 and 4 more children per 1000 being classified as
stunted and severely stunted, respectively. In column (4), we add mother fixed effect
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and still find a precisely estimated effect of 7 more children per 1000 being classified
as stunted as a result of increased violence in the first trimester of pregnancy.
The estimated effects for weight, in Panel B of Table A.9, however, seem to be
stronger for exposure during the second and third trimester, with likelihood of low
birth being impacted by terrorist activity thorughout the course of the pregnancy.
We would, nevertheless, like to caution the reader that because we do not observe the
exact gestational age of the child, we are likely measuring our trimester ‘treatment’
periods with error, and hence these results are at best suggestive in nature.
A.1.1.2 Attacks Immediately Prior to Child’s Conception
Recent research in the medical literature has identified pathways linking maternal
nutrition at and before conception with child outcomes at birth. From a review of
45 studies, Ramakrishnan et al. (2012) conclude that worse maternal nutritional and
vitamin intake even before pregnancy is related to increased likelihood of pre-term
and low-birth weight births. Grieger et al. (2014) and King (2016) provide similar
evidence regarding the importance of the 9 to 12 months period immediately prior to
conception. In this subsection we try to augment our earlier analysis and explore the
impact of violence 9 months before conception on child health outcomes.
Columns (3) and (7) in Table A.10 present results from our fully controlled tehsil
fixed effect specification. Panel A shows that likelihood of being classified as stunted
or severely stunted is not impacted by violence suffered by the mother in the pre-
conception period. However, there is some evidence of violent activity 9 months prior
to conception negatively influencing likelihood of very low weight. A 1 SD increase in
intensity of attack in the pre-conception period leads to 4.4 more children per 1000
(p < 0.05) being classified as very low weight in our tehsil fixed effect specification.
In our fully saturated specification that includes maternal fixed effects, we see an
increase of 5 per 1000 children (p < 0.10) classified as very low weight as a result
of pre-conception violence. Interestingly, we see very similar effect sizes for pre-birth
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measures of violence compared to our baseline estimates in Table A.3. The post-
birth estimates though are slightly higher in magnitude especially for low weight
classification compared to our baseline results. Overall the evidence presented in this
section sheds light on the far-reaching effects of violence on child health outcomes,
with negative shocks even before the mother is pregnant having an influence on child
health measures.
A.1.1.3 Spillovers from Neighboring Tehsils
We next explore whether attacks in nearby regions impact health outcomes of children
living in a given tehsil. If terrorist activity in a broad region disrupts transportation
infrastructure and supply routes of goods, like perishable food items, then one might
expect significant impacts of violence in even neighboring areas that are different
from the area of residence of the child. On the other hand, if the effects are primarily
driven by stress related channels then one is more likely to find impacts concentrated
only in the tehsil of residence of the mother and the child. We present results from
an exercise designed to uncover such potential mechanisms in Table A.11. We define
neighboring regions as all tehsils (sub-districts) in the zila (district) of residence of
the mother and the child.1 Therefore, the ‘Intensity Pre-Birth Other Tehsils’ variable
in Table A.11 measures the pre-birth attack intensity in all neighboring tehsils in the
zila of residence for a given child. We report results for our intensity variable only
for our most saturated model - the mother fixed effects specification.2
Columns (1) and (4) reproduce results from our baseline specification and corre-
spond to columns (4) and (8) in Tables A.2 and A.3. In columns (2) and (5) we
investigate the effect of attacks only in neighboring regions on child health outcomes.
None of the coefficients for any of the four outcomes we consider are statistically
significant. In columns (3) and (6) we add both own tehsil and neighboring tehsil
terrorist activity. The results for the former are almost identical to columns (1) and
1There are 150 tehsils and 36 zilas in Punjab with a mean of 4.2 and a median of 4 tehsils per zila.
2Results from the tehsil fixed effect specifications present identical patterns
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(4) and the estimates for the latter remain statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Furthermore, given that the estimates on ‘own’ terror activity barely change after
controlling for neighboring tehsils this implies negligible spatial correlation in terror-
ist activity. This provides further evidence, albeit indirect, that terrorists are unlikely
to systematically choose particular areas as a function of its characteristics. Overall,
these findings suggest a larger role for stress and fear based channels explaining the
adverse effects documented in our study, since that these are particularly likely to be
salient as function of proximity to the attack.
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Figure A.1: Trends in Terrorism in Punjab - 1990 - 2016
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Note: Data based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the University of Maryland.
Figure A.3: Trends in Terrorism in Pakistan - 1990 - 2016
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Note: Data based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the University of Maryland.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics by Terrorist Activity
Full Sample Tehsil with Attacks Tehsil without Attacks Difference in Means
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age at Marriage 20.20 20.01 20.25 −0.247∗∗∗
(in years) (4.231) (4.311) (4.206) (0.052)
No Education 0.489 0.506 0.485 0.021∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.006)
Primary Education 0.192 0.177 0.196 −0.018∗∗∗
(0.394) (0.383) (0.397) (0.005)
Middle and Secondary 0.224 0.221 0.225 −0.005
Education (0.417) (0.415) (0.418) (0.005)
Higher Education 0.094 0.095 0.094 0.001
(0.292) (0.293) (0.291) (0.004)
Ever Breastfed 0.968 0.970 0.967 0.003
(0.176) (0.169) (0.178) (0.002)
Wealth Index −0.105 −0.131 −0.097 −0.034∗∗
(0.992) (1.039) (0.977) (0.012)
Head No Education 0.392 0.402 0.388 0.013
(0.488) (0.490) (0.487) (0.006)
Head Primary Education 0.184 0.172 0.187 −0.015∗∗∗
(0.387) (0.378) (0.390) (0.005)
Head Middle and 0.322 0.321 0.322 −0.001
Secondary Education (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.006)
Head Higher Education 0.100 0.104 0.099 0.005
(0.301) (0.305) (0.299) (0.004)
Number of Women 15-49 1.652 1.641 1.655 −0.013
years old (1.096) (1.122) (1.088) (0.013)
Stunted 0.327 0.334 0.325 0.010
(0.469) (0.472) [(0.468) (0.006)
Severely Stunted 0.138 0.146 0.136 0.010
(0.345) (0.353) (0.343) (0.004)
Low Weight 0.295 0.304 0.293 0.011
(0.456) (0.459) (0.455) (0.006)
Very Low Weight 0.098 0.104 0.096 0.008
(0.297) (0.305) (0.294) (0.004)
Number of Observations 40,169 8,993 31,236 40,169
Data from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Columns (1) to (3) present sample
means with standard deviations in brackets. Column (4) presents difference in mean between tehsil with attack and tehsil without
attacks with standard error from the t-test in brackets. *** and **, indicate significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively.
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Figure A.2: Intensity of Attacks by Tehsil 2007-2011
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Table A.4: Effect of Terrorism on Vaccination Take-up at Birth (per 1000 children)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Tuberculosis 30 days 60 days 90 days
Intensity in Relevant Window before Birth −2.283∗∗ −7.031∗∗∗ −5.238∗∗∗
(1.111) (2.062) (1.718)
Number of Observations 17,021 17,021 17,021
Panel B: Pentavalent
Intensity in Relevant Window before Birth −2.205 −8.404∗∗∗ −6.864∗∗∗
(1.651) (2.884) (3.231)
Number of Observations 14,375 14,375 14,375
Tehsil Fixed Effects   
Maternal Controls   
*** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Intensity of attack is defined as
the number of fatalities per attack. Coefficients are standardized to reflect 1 standard deviation changes
in intensity of attack. Maternal controls include age of mother at birth of child, a dummy for first child,
whether child was breastfed, age of mother at marriage, maternal education, household head education,
number of women in household, a dummy for female child, and a household wealth index. All regressions
include a calendar month of birth and birth year.
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Table A.5: Incidence of Terrorism and Maternal and Household Characteristics
Intensity of Attack Number of Fatalities
Pre-Birth Post-Birth Pre-Birth Post-Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maternal Vars.
Age at Childbirth 0.003 0.001 0.005 −0.001 −0.0016 0.002 −0.021 −0.012
(0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.078) (0.002) (0.046) (0.007)
Age at Marriage −0.019 −0.004 −0.019 0.003 −0.021 0.001 −0.114 0.010
(0.016) (0.003) (0.031) (0.003) (0.018) (0.007) (0.109) (0.010)
Child Breast Fed −0.002 −0.026 0.040 −0.036 −0.085 -0.016 −0.237 0.026
(0.095) (0.035) (0.164) (0.042) (0.172) (0.045) (0.869) (0.161)
Primary Educ −0.076 −0.033 −0.181 −0.013 0.067 −0.023 0.111 −0.109
(0.100) (0.025) (0.182) (0.017) (0.211) (0.047) (0.710) (0.082)
Secondary Educ −0.006 −0.055 −0.110 0.001 0.515 0.086 1.864 −0.044
(0.117) (0.056) (0.146) (0.021) (0.576) (0.195) (2.018) (0.108)
Middle Educ −0.029 −0.029 −0.182 −0.041 0.268 0.011 0.984 −0.199
(0.093) (0.045) (0.144) (0.043) (0.322) (0.085) (1.410) (0.117)
Higher Educ 0.062 0.055 −0.311 −0.060 0.255 0.253 −0.757 −0.147
(0.077) (0.045) (0.243) (0.033) (0.202) (0.153) (0.557) (0.175)
Household Head
Primary Educ −0.052 −0.036 −0.094 −0.015 0.023 0.019 0.096 0.131
(0.055) (0.034) (0.103) (0.024) (0.127) (0.080) (0.399) (0.131)
Secondary Educ 0.017 −0.006 −0.014 −0.004 0.059 0.017 0.235 0.158
(0.028) (0.037) (0.113) (0.015) (0.076) (0.099) (0.429) (0.116)
Middle Educ 0.055 −0.021 0.021 −0.017 0.388 0.039 1.615 0.147
(0.074) (0.043) (0.069) (0.019) (0.309) (0.093) (1.214) (0.226)
Higher Educ 0.055 −0.021 0.124 −0.023 −0.051 −0.248 1.324 0.392
(0.074) (0.043) (0.184) (0.022) (0.083) (0.151) (0.829) (0.323)
Wealth Index 0.013 0.030 0.121 0.018 0.189 −0.029 1.297 −0.013
(0.106) (0.019) (0.235) (0.020) (0.228) (0.079) (1.453) (0.053)
Tehsil F.E ×  ×  ×  × 
Birth Year ×  ×  ×  × 
& Month F.E
***, and ** indicate significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. Intensity of attack is defined as the number of fatalities per
attack. The number of observations across columns is 41,025.
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Table A.11: Spillovers from Neighboring Tehsils - Stunting and Weight - Mother Fixed Effects
Stunted Severely Stunted
Panel A: Height (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intensity Pre-Birth 4.212 − 4.239 4.891∗∗ − 4.794∗∗
Own Tehsil (2.142) (2.147) (2.249) (2.272)
Intensity Post-Birth 18.595∗∗ − 18.55∗∗ 12.57 − 12.61
Own Tehsil (8.344) (8.297) (9.757) (10.02)
Intensity Pre-Birth − 2.284 1.827 − −2.301 −2.606
Other Tehsils (5.504) (5.483) (4.974) (5.020)
Intensity Post-Birth − −0.884 −1.463 − 6.464 5.963
Other Tehsils (10.53) (11.03) (9.858) (10.20)
Number of Observations 39,623 39,623 39,623 39,623 39,623 39,623
Panel B: Weight Low Weight Very Low Weight
Intensity Pre-Birth 1.656 − 1.415 7.489∗∗ − 7.341∗∗
Own Tehsil (3.796) (3.405) (2.844) (2.945)
Intensity Post-Birth 11.65∗∗ − 11.32∗∗ 4.973 − 4.928
Own Tehsil (4.668) (5.185) (5.979) (6.542)
Intensity Pre-Birth − 5.926 5.650 − −0.661 −0.763
Other Tehsils (6.094) (6.018) (4.728) (4.706)
Intensity Post-Birth − 17.50∗ 17.24 − 10.42 9.936
Other Tehsils (9.480) (9.338) (7.189) (7.515)
Mother Fixed Effects (F.E)      
Birth Year and Month F.E      
Time Varying Maternal Controls      
Number of Observations 39,730 39,730 39,730 39,730 39,730 39,730
***, and ** indicate significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. Intensity of attack is defined as the number of fatalities per
attack. Coefficients are standardized to reflect 1 standard deviation changes in intensity of attack.Maternal controls include age
of mother at birth of child, a dummy for first child, whether child was breastfed, age of mother at marriage, maternal education,
household head education, number of women in household, a dummy for female child, and a household wealth index. All regressions
include a calendar month of birth and birth year.
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